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The Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A




The demand for inexpensive, efficient, legal redress for small mone-
tary claims has troubled judicial and legislative authorities throughout
American and English judicial history.I The expense and complexity of
common-law litigation procedures often exceed the value of a small mon-
etary claim, effectively closing the courtroom door to small monetary
claimants.
2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A. 1973, M.A. 1974, University of South Florida; J.D. 1980, Duke University School of
Law.
The author wishes to thank Professors Mary Kay Kane and Herbert Hovenkamp for their
very useful comments and suggestions, and Judge John Ertola and Jerome Falk for first bring-
ing the issues discussed in this Article to her attention. The author also wishes to thank Louise
Frances, David Moyce, Lee Goldberg, Karen Knight, Bob Wenbourne, and Fletcher Alford
for their invaluable research assistance.
I. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE, 1876, at 103-14 (1877); G. SCHRAMM, PIEPOUDRE COURTS 1-7 (1928); R.
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 6-12, 20, 23 (1921); Burger, Keynote Address to the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice (Apr.
7, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 92-93 (1976); King, Small Claims Practice in the United
States, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 42, 42 (1977); Smith, Denial of Justice, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE
SoC'Y 112, 113-14 (1919); Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. Rns. J. 295, 295; Yngvesson & Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Re-
view of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 219, 221-28 (1975).
2. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Small Claims Court, 141 Cal. App. 3d
470, 474, 190 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342-43 (1983) ("[O]rdinary litigation 'fails to bring practical
justice' when the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordi-
nary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages legal
resolution of the dispute.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pace v. Hillerest Motor Co., 101 Cal.
App. 3d 476, 478, 161 Cal. Rptr. 662, 663 (1980)); Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co. v. Young,
150 Minn. 452, 455, 185 N.W. 934, 936 (1921) ("[L]itigation by the common-law method over
small claims is wasteful, and fails to bring practical justice because of an expense out of propor-
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Parliament and American state legislatures, past and present, have
responded to this problem by creating special small claims tribunals.
These tribunals have dispensed with many of the features of common-law
litigation procedure that have generated complexity, expense, and delay,
such as formal pleading, discovery, and lawyers.3 Presently, over three-
fourths of American states have such small claims tribunals, generally
denominated "small claims courts."4 Small claims jurisdiction is nar-
rowly prescribed by statute and generally is limited to monetary claims
under a stated amount, which ranges from $200 to $5000.
5
Notwithstanding sincere legislative effort, it often is contended that
the present small claims tribunals have failed to accomplish their goal of
making legal resolution of small monetary claims financially feasible and
efficient. 6 One reason for this failure is that most modem small claims
procedures still provide litigants with access to a jury, either initially in
the small claims tribunal, through removal to another court, or on
appeal.
7
Access to a jury, however, is usually waived. 8 When a jury is de-
manded it adds tremendously to the cost, time, and complexity of trial,
and can easily boost litigation costs beyond the amount of the claim. 9
tion to the amounts involved, the time of the parties consumed in the litigation when they
should be engaged otherwise, and the attendant delay in reaching a result.").
3. See, e.g., Crouchman v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 102, 108, 217 Cal. Rptr.
910, 913, petition for review granted, 708 P.2d 703, 220 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1985); J. RUHNKA, S.
WELLER & J. MARTIN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ST. CTS., SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 1-3 (1978)
[hereinafter SMALL CLAIMS COURTS]; King, supra note 1, at 45-50; Steele, supra note 1, at
330-37 (means of decreasing expense include eliminating complicated pleading and pretrial
procedures, relaxing the rules of evidence, reducing court fees, eliminating or discouraging
attorneys, granting procedural discretion to judges, and attempting to encourage conciliation
between the litigants); see also infra notes 58-69, 84-90, 104-110 and accompanying text.
4. Some states still retain updated versions of the old justice of the peace courts, which
were more popular in past centuries. See Joseph & Friedman, Consumer Redress through the
Small Claims Court: A Proposed Model Consumer Justice Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REV.
839, 840 n.5 (1977); King, supra note 1, at 44 n. 12; infra notes 104-26 and accompanying text.
For a general description of modern small claims courts, see SMALL CLAIMS COURTS,
supra note 3.
5. For a comparison of the jurisdictional limits of the small claims courts of various
states, see SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, supra note 3, app. A; Joseph & Friedman, supra note 4,
app.
6. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 1, at 88, 93; Joseph & Friedman, supra note 4, at 839-41.
7. See infra notes 12, 163 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Nelson, The Small Claims Court, 22 WIS. B. BULL. 237, 240 (1949); Spur-
rier, Small Claims Are Big Business in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 327, 329 (1978).
9. When superimposed on a small claims procedure designed to expand the average
citizen's access to the justice system, the cherished procedure of trial by jury can have a highly
destructive impact. Often it takes longer to obtain a jury trial than a court trial, and more
appearances are required. Jury instructions, formal rules of evidence, and voir dire become
necessary, which makes it difficult or impossible for the small claims plaintiff to proceed pro se.
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Wealthy defendants have learned that merely demanding a jury as a stra-
tegic measure may deter less wealthy small claims plaintiffs from pro-
ceeding with their claims.' 0 In economic terms, a jury trial for very
small monetary claims can be wasteful and can lead to injustice by mak-
ing legal redress for small claims too expensive and time consuming to be
feasible for the average small monetary claimant."
Generally, lawyer fees along with jury fees and time away from work will exceed the small
claim of $500 or $1000. When the added inconvenience, effort, and time are taken into ac-
count, few small monetary claimants will determine that even a larger amount-in-controversy
justifies proceeding. The jury trial thus serves as a potential roadblock to the small monetary
claimant's access to the courts. See Crouchxnan v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 102, 113,
217 Cal. Rptr. 910, 916 (1985) (Brauer, I., concurring) ("The goal sought to be achieved by the
small claims scheme would, in my opinion, be severely impeded by the availability of juries."),
petition for review granted, 708 P.2d 703, 220 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1985); County of Portage v.
Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 481, 312 N.W.2d 731, 738 (1981); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B.
BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 78 (1959) (research indicates that jury trials take roughly
40% longer than bench trials); Special Project, Judicial Reform at the Lowest Level: A Model
Statute for Small Claims Courts, 28 VAND. L. Rv. 711, 781 (1975) [hereinafter Special Pro-
ject, Model Statute] (providing jury trials in small claims courts would frustrate goal of speedy
and inexpensive adjudication of small claims); Small Claims Court Reform Revisited, 5
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROns. Aug. 1969, at 56 (jury trials, which bring delay and increase
procedural and evidentiary requirements, are inappropriate for small claims).
The fact that many small claims parties waive the jury trial is not an answer to the prob-
lem, for it provides no consolation to the individual small claims plaintiff who has a meritori-
ous claim and whose ability to vindicate it is effectively blocked by his opponent's strategic
demand for a jury trial. There is little comfort in a justice system that confronts an individual
claimant with the Hobson's choice between abandoning a meritorious claim or proceeding
with litigation at a cost that is likely to exceed the amount-in-controversy.
A number of critics have argued that the civil jury should be dispensed with in all cases.
See, eg., Karlen, Can a State Abolish the Civil Jury?, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 103, 104; Landis,
Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950 (1970); New Constitution for US.?,
TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1970, at 5; O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 58 ILL. B.J. 796, 796-97
(1970);G. SCHRAMM, supra note 1, at 30-33, 118-19. This Article does not address this larger
question, but confines itself to the question of juries for "small claims."
10. See, eg., Crouchman, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (Braner, J.,
concurring) ("[One] should ponder which small claims litigant is likely to have counsel and
insist on a jury: it will be the corporation or governmental agency with access to house coun-
sel, the rare indigent for whom Legal Aid wishes to bring a test case, and the man to whom
money is no object. It certainly will not be Everyman. And it should not take the favored ones
long to recognize the potential for legal extortion inherent in a jury demand."); COMMISSION
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE, REPORT TO 1934 N.Y. ST.
LEGISLATURE, at 728-32 (1934) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; Markwardt, The Nature
and Operation of the New York Small Claims Courts, 38 ALB. L. REv. 196, 203 & n.68 (1974)
(discussing "statistically-proven fact that most jury trials are demanded by defendants merely
for the purposes of delay"); Joseph & Friedman, supra note 4, at 870 n.87.
11. See supra note 9; see also Stoller, Small Claims Courts in Texas: Paradise Lost, 47
TEX. L. REv. 448, 456-57 (1969); Joseph & Friedman, supra note 4, at 869-70 & n.84; Burger,
supra note 1, at 92-93.
An opposing argument suggests itself in the literature of critics who see the small claims
court as a tool for accomplishing the social and political goals of giving greater power to
consumers and a voice to the indigent. See generally Steele, supra note 1. From this point of
November 1987] RIGHT TO JURY
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Nonetheless, courts, legislators, and scholars alike have assumed
that access to a jury is constitutionally mandated for small monetary
claims at some point in the litigation process 12 because claims for money
damages are "legal" in nature, and would have been tried to a jury at
common-law. 13 Aside from a small handful of isolated court opinions,
this assumption has not been questioned or probed. 14 State legislatures
thus have supposed they had no choice but to structure small claims
tribunals to provide a jury upon demand, either in the small claims tribu-
nal itself, by removal to a common-law court, or through a trial de novo
on appeal from the small claims tribunal. 15
view, and to the extent that the presence of a jury in small claims court might further this goal,
it could be argued that the public should underwrite the cost of the jury trial, no matter how
great, for all small claims parties that desire it.
12. See, e.g., SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, supra note 3, at 3-4, 155-57; Joseph & Friedman,
supra note 4, at 870-71 & n.87; Spurrier, supra note 8, at 329; Vance, A Proposed Court of
Conciliation, 1 MINN. L. REV. 107, 112, 115 (1917); Note, The California Small Claims Court,
52 CAL. L. REV. 876, 881 (1964) (authored by C. Pagter, R. McCloskey & M. Reinis).
The proceedings of many modem American small claims tribunals have been structured
so that claims are tried to the court initially, with one or both of the parties retaining a right to
demand a jury in a trial de novo on appeal. See infra note 15. This practice of deferring access
to a jury until appeal has been challenged many times as a denial of the constitutional right to
jury trial. In resolving these cases courts repeatedly have assumed that a right to jury exists for
small monetary claims, but have found that such a right is satisfied by access to a jury on
appeal. See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 37 (1898); Universal Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Walker, 237 Ala. 413, 414-15, 187 So. 495, 496-97 (1939); Wilson v. Oldfield, 1 Del.
Cas. 622, 628 (1818); Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co. v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 457, 185 N.W.
934, 936 (1921); Norton v. McLeary, 8 Ohio St. 171, 174 (1858); In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 230,
112 A.2d 625, 629 (1955).
13. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 480-
87 (1985).
14. Courts rarely have found it necessary to focus directly on the question whether the
right to jury exists for small monetary claims, particularly for those which exceed the ceiling
amount-in-controversy for juryless proceedings in the historic precedents to modem small
claims courts. See infra notes 77-80, 87-91, 108-26 and accompanying text. When they have, a
small handful of courts have determined that an exception to the constitutional right to a jury
exists for very small monetary claims. See, e.g., Crouchman v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App.
3d 102, 217 Cal. Rptr. 910, petition for review granted, 708 P.2d 703, 220 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1985); Maldonado v. Superior Court, No. 16272 (San Francisco Super. Ct., Sept. 8, 1983), rev.
on other grounds, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 209 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1984) (withholding opinion on
question of exception to jury trial right for small claims); Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 241-
42 (1871); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 725-27 (Iowa 1981).
15. See Joseph & Friedman, supra note 4, at 869-70 & app.; Special Project, Model Stat-
ute, supra note 9, at 780; Legislation, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 932, 939-40 (1934). Though legisla-
tures have created access to juries for small claims, it is interesting to observe the many devices
they have simultaneously adopted to discourage parties from availing themselves of that ac-
cess. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 117.12, 117.14 (West Supp. 1986) (awarding addi-
tional fees to plaintiff if defendant loses de novo appeal); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 285
(Smith-Hurd 1985) (jury fees); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 799.21(3), 814.61(4) (West Supp. 1986)
(jury fees); see also Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 9, at 56 (the District of
[Vol. 39
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RIGHT TO JURY
This Article suggests that, at least in many states, provision for a
jury is not constitutionally mandated for small monetary claims. State
constitutional jury trial guarantees generally are construed to preserve
only the right to jury as it existed in England or the American colony or
territory as of a certain time in history-usually the date the state consti-
tution was adopted-and not to extend that right. During the relevant
historical periods, England and many American colonies and territories
provided a procedure for adjudicating small monetary claims that af-
forded no access to a jury. Thus, this historic exception to the right to
jury should be incorporated into the present constitutional guarantees.
Section I of this Article discusses the proper test for determining
whether a state constitutional right to jury exists for small monetary
claims. This section determines that a historical test, which looks to the
practice in England or in the American colony or territory when the state
constitution was adopted, generally is the proper test.
Turning to an application of the historical test, sections II and III
will examine the availability of juries for small monetary claims in Eng-
land and in the American colonies and territories during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The section shows that these juris-
dictions provided small claims tribunals to adjudicate small monetary
claims without access to a jury at any phase of the litigation.
Section IV concludes that, under the historical test for the right to
jury, the early practice of adjudicating small claims without provision for
a jury should be incorporated into the constitutional jury trial guarantee
in many states, and should permit similar juryless procedures today.
This is so even when the original juryless small claims tribunals had con-
current jurisdiction with common-law courts which did afford a jury.
States may not provide any juryless small claims procedure unless
one was available during the relevant historical period, but when a jury-
less small claims procedure is authorized, it need not duplicate the earlier
procedures. Section V examines the constitutional requirements for jury-I
Columbia discourages jury trials by imposing a fixed fee and requiring a written demand for
jury on short notice); see generally G. SCHRAMM, supra note 1, at 83, 118-19.
Courts generally have tolerated such provisions. See, eg., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 45 (1898) (upholding payment of a bond as a prerequisite to removal to a court
where jury trial could be had); County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 475-76, 312
N.W.2d 731, 739 (1981) (upholding additional fees when requested by jury). But cf Flour City
Fuel & Transfer Co., 150 Minn. at 458, 185 N.W. at 936 (holding a bond requirement for
removal to a court where jury trial was available violative of state constitutional jury right).
When courts of general jurisdiction have concurrent jurisdiction with a small claims tri-
bunal, the plaintiff often is deemed to have waived his right to jury by having chosen the small
claims forum. See Legislation, supra, at 939-40.
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less adjudication procedures. The Article suggests that a juryless proce-
dure will satisfy constitutional requirements as long as the appropriate
legislative body reasonably determines that a summary, juryless proce-
dure is necessary in order to make relief available as a practical matter to
persons with small monetary claims, fashions a procedure reasonably cal-
culated to accomplish that end, and limits its availability to those claims
whose amount-in-controversy and ramifications cannot justify the time
and expense of a jury.
Finally, section VI suggests that modem legislative bodies, like their
preconstitutional counterparts, should be able to determine and periodi-
cally adjust the amount-in-controversy that will be deemed a "small
claim" for purposes of the juryless adjudication procedure. Amount-in-
controversy requirements should take into account objective factors such
as changes in the value of money and in the complexity and expense of
litigation.
I. The Appropriate Test for Determining the Right to Jury
Ascertaining the appropriate test for determining whether a right to
jury attaches to small monetary claims is a threshold consideration in
this inquiry. In determining the extent of the seventh amendment guar-
antee of civil jury trial,16 federal courts apply a "historical test": The
court looks to the practice in England in 1791, the year in which the
states ratified the seventh amendment. 17 If a jury would have been pro-
vided for the claim at that time, 18 the Constitution requires that one be
provided today.19 The seventh amendment is interpreted not to create
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.
17. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
18. The right to civil jury trial is not restricted to types of actions in existence in 1791
that were tried by jury. The right also attaches to subsequently created statutory causes of
action that are analogous to actions that would have been tried by jury in 1791. J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 481. However, if a statutory
cause of action was unknown in 1791 then there is no right to jury. See, e.g., United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) (no jury right in suit against United States in Court of Claims,
since Tucker Act, not Constitution, created the cause of action against the government).
19. This historical test has been criticized as unduly rigid, arbitrary and unresponsive to
modern needs. See, e.g., James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 664
(1963); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639 (1973). Moreover, there is some evidence that the United States Supreme Court may be
moving toward a more functional approach to determining the right to jury. See Kane, Civil
Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7-12 (1976). It is beyond
[Vol. 39
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any new right to jury trial, but merely to preserve the right as it existed
when the amendment was adopted.
2 0
The seventh amendment is inapplicable to the states,21 but virtually
all the states have their own constitutional civil jury trial guarantees,
22
and the federal courts' interpretation of the seventh amendment has been
highly influential in the interpretation of these state provisions. 23 The
wording of the state provisions varies,24 but they, like their federal coun-
terpart, routinely have been interpreted to preserve, not to extend or re-
strict, the right to a jury trial that existed as of a certain date.25 Some
states have followed the federal practice of defining the right to jury as
coextensive with the right as it existed in England.2 6 Many states, how-
ever, have looked to the practice in their own territory or colony prior to
statehood, in addition to or instead of the practice in England.27 More-
the scope of this Article to question the merits of the historical test. Rather, this Article will
merely seek to determine whether, under the historical test as presently followed in most
states, dispensing with juries for small monetary claims in small claims tribunals is permissible.
20. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 480, 483; Wolfram, supra note
19, at 64042.
21. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); Brown v. New Jersey, 175
U.S. 172, 174 (1899); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 34143, 335 A.2d 670, 673-75 (1975).
22. The only states without constitutional guarantees are Colorado (CoLo. CONST. art.
II, § 23 expressly guarantees a right to jury only in criminal cases) and Louisiana (LA. CONST.
art. I, § 17 guarantees a right to jury only in criminal cases). Utah and Wyoming (UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 10 and Wyo. CONsT. art. I, § 9) both lack an express provision, but courts
have nonetheless assumed a constitutional right. See Kane, supra note 19, at 3 n.8.
23. See, eg., Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1176 & n.1 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Haradav.
Bums, 50 Haw. 528, 532, 445 P.2d 376, 379-80 (1968).
24. E.g., ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 23 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.");
DEL. CONsT. art. I, § 4 ("Trial by jury shall be as heretofore."); Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7
("The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain invio-
late."); ME. CONsT. art. I, § 20 ("In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning prop-
erty, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been
otherwise practiced."); MICH. CoNST. art. I, § 14 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain.");
VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XII ("[W]hen any issue in fact, proper for the cognizance of a jury is
joined in a court of law, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held
sacred.").
25. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 503-04; J. PROF-
FATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 84 at, 124-25 (1877); James, supra note 19, at 655.
A few states have extended the constitutional right to jury to cases that historically would
have been tried in equity, without a jury. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 16(1); TENN. CONST. art.
I, § 6; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 15, art. V, § 10.
26. E.g., People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 231 P.2d 832, 835
(1951); State v. Jutila, 34 Idaho 595, 597, 202 P. 566, 566 (1921); Miller's Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
American State Bank, 206 Ind. 511, 515, 190 N.E. 433, 435 (1934).
27. See, eg., Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 473, 102 N.E. 665, 668
(1913) (court looks to the right as it existed in the Colony of Massachusetts); Flour City Fuel
& Transfer Co. v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 454, 185 N.W. 934, 935 (1921) (court looks to
November 1987] RIGHT TO JURY
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over, most state constitutional guarantees are interpreted to preserve the
jury practice as it existed when the state constitutional guarantee was
adopted. 28 This date, of course, varies from state to state.
Thus, in applying the historical test to determine whether, as a gen-
eral matter,29 states are required under their constitutions to provide a
jury for small monetary claims, one must consider the jury practices for
small claims in England and in the colonies and territories from the
1770s until the late 1800s. It generally does not matter whether the rele-
vant jury practice was dictated by custom, case law, or statute. Many
American courts have held that their state's constitution preserves the
right to jury "as it existed at common law or by statute,"' 0 and statutes
practice in the Territory of Minnesota); El Paso Elec. Co. v. Real Estate Mart, Inc., 98 N.M.
490, 495, 650 P.2d 12, 17 (1982) (court looks to jury practice in the Territory of New Mexico);
Baxter v. Putney, 37 How. Pr. 140, 143 (N.Y. County Ct. 1868) (court looks to the practice in
the Colony of New York); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89, 94-96 (1862) (court looks both
to the practice in England and in the Province of Pennsylvania); State ex rel. Mullen v. Do-
herty, 16 Wash. 382, 384, 47 P. 958, 959 (1897) (court looks to the right to jury as it existed in
the Territory).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 248, 590 S.W.2d 6, 13 (1979); County of Port-
age v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 471, 312 N.W.2d 731, 733 (1981); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 481-82, 503-04.
There is some difference among the states regarding whether the constitutional right to
jury is strictly the right as it existed when the first state constitutional jury guarantee was
adopted, see, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294,
297, 64 A.2d 39, 41 (1949); Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 127 Fla. 687, 690, 173 So.
820, 825 (1937); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 636, 286 S.E.2d 89, 98
(1982); Mason v. State ex rel. McCoy, 58 Ohio St. 30, 50 N.E. 6, 9 (1898), or whether it is the
right as it existed when subsequent constitutional provisions were adopted, see, e.g., De Lamar
v. Dollar, 128 Ga. 57, 58-59, 57 S.E. 85, 88 (1907); Liska v. Chicago Rys. Co., 318 Ill. 570,
583, 149 N.E. 469, 476 (1925); J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, CPLR MANUAL
§ 23.03(a), at 23-11 (1980) (authored by 0. Chase) (The New York Constitution was originally
adopted in 1777 and interpreted to preserve the jury trial right existing at that time. New
constitutions were adopted in 1821, 1846, and 1894 and each new constitution was held to
expand the jury trial guarantee to all statutory jury trial rights that had been implemented
since the prior constitution was adopted. Subsequent New York constitutions have been inter-
preted to freeze the constitutional right as of 1894.).
29. Of necessity, this Article will deal in some generalities. It will suggest appropriate
general rules of law for determining the right to jury for small monetary claims and discuss the
prevailing practices in England and certain sample American colonies and territories during
the historical periods that are relevant to the determination of the right to jury in most states.
The Article will seek to draw some conclusions based on these general rules and practices, but
will not undertake an individualized analysis of the right to jury for small monetary claims in
any particular state. Individual states may have varied the general rules of law discussed in
this Article or may have unique historical jury practices that would lead to a different conclu-
sion concerning the right to jury under the historical test than is reached in this Article.
30. E.g., Kilgore v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 138 Ga. App. 890, 892, 227 S.E.2d 860, 862
(1976); People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951);
see also Chowan & S. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 105 N.C. 246, 248, 11 S.E. 328, 328 (1890); State ex
rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 385, 47 P. 958, 959; Ex parte Higgins v. Hoctor, 332
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which affirmatively granted a positive right to jury as well as those which
expressly denied the right are both relevant.
31
II. The Right to Jury in England during the Seventeenth,
Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries
Between the seventeenth and late nineteenth centuries, the English
judicial system was a veritable patchwork of diverse tribunals that had
accumulated over the years to serve particular constituencies or to apply
particular kinds of law.32 In addition to the three great common-law
courts33-the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of King's Bench and
the Court of the Exchequer-there were equity courts, ecclesiastical
courts, military courts, university courts, courts of commerce, 34 and a
Mo. 1022, 1031, 62 S.W.2d 410, 414 (1933); Morton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 735-
36, 241 P. 1014, 1015-16 (1925).
In those states that look to the historic English practice to determine the constitutional
right to jury, it might be argued that the state's policy concerning the incorporation of English
statutes into the state common law would control the effect of English statutes governing the
right to jury on the perimeters of the constitutional right. See generally McKean, British Stat-
utes in American Jurisdiction, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1929). While this argument has some
appeal, it ultimately should be rejected. Ascertainment of the English practice for purposes of
constitutional jury trial guarantees is a separate constitutional inquiry, independent of a state's
determination of which English statutes should be deemed incorporated into the state's sub-
stantive common law.
31. For example, in Board of Supervisors v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 221, 227 (1866), the Wis-
consin Supreme Court found that a territorial statute in effect when the state constitution was
adopted authorized courts of law to refer long accounts to referees or auditors, thus depriving
the parties of a jury determination. In light of this statute, the court concluded that there was
no present constitutional right to jury for long accounts, for "[w]hen our state constitution was
adopted, it did not take away this right of reference, but only provided that the right of trial by
jury should remain as it was before." Id. at 228; see also Crouchman v. Superior Court, 192
Cal. App. 3d 102, 217 Cal. Rptr. 910 (English statute entrusting final resolution of cases in-
volving less than 5 pounds to the judge of county court provides basis for denying right to jury
in small claims courts today), petition for review granted, 708 P.2d 703, 220 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1985); Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 337, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (upholding reference of entire
cause as sanctioned by statute and practiced before adoption of the constitution); Willyard v.
Hamilton, 7 Ohio 111, 116 (1836) (statute existing prior to state constitution provided for
appointment of commissioners to resolve disputes in place of jury, and thus no right to jury
was preserved in such cases by subsequent constitutional provision).
32. See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 4-5 (1950).
33. For a discussion of the common-law courts, see I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 194-264 (7th ed. 1956) and R. POUND, supra note 32, at 9-10, 16-18.
34. See generally 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *61-
70 (describing ecclesiastical, military and maritime courts); id. at *83-85 (describing the uni-
versity courts); I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 395-445 (describing the chancery court);
id. at 526-632 (describing courts of special jurisdiction including merchant, admiralty, military
and ecclesiastical courts); R. POUND, supra note 32, at 15-25 (giving a brief overview of the
various English courts).
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host of other more specialized tribunals. 35 These courts varied not only
in jurisdiction and substantive law applied, but also in procedure and
means of determining questions of fact. 36 The jury as we know it today,
was the particular vehicle of the three common-law courts.37 At the bot-
35. For example, the Court of Marshalsea (jurisdiction over disputes involving members
of the royal household), the Courts of Special Justices of Oyer and Terminer (jurisdiction to
determine controversies over money collected for houses of correction or for the poor, and to
hear complaints concerning colleges, hospitals and alms houses), and the Courts of the Stanna-
ries (jurisdiction over disputes concerning tin mines and tin miners). See generally I W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, 153-65, 208-09, 273-74; R. POUND, supra note 32, at 4-22.
36. One of the earlier commerce courts, the ancient piepoudre, or "piepowder" court, has
been cited as a precedent for modern juryless small claims tribunals. See Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1981); G. SCHRAMM, supra note 1, at 4-5.
In the middle ages much trade was transacted at fairs and markets. The King granted
franchises to individuals or towns to hold such fairs and the right to hold a piepoudre court
was considered an incident of the franchise. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 535-36;
L. CROSS & J. HAND, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 240-42 (5th ed. 1971). The piepoudre
courts' jurisdiction extended to both civil and criminal complaints that arose in the course of
the fair. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *32-33; W. GREENWOOD, BOYAEYTHPION OR
A PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION OF COUNTY JUDICATURES 149 (5th ed. 1675).
The piepoudre courts applied the law merchant, which was based on the accepted cus-
toms of merchants throughout Western Europe. The steward of the fair presided, and he was
assisted in disposing of cases by the gathered merchants, who were familiar with the customs.
See Thompson, The Development of the Anglo-American Judicial System, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 9,
33 (1931) (suggesting that the merchants were loose equivalents of the suitors in the county,
hundred and manor courts); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 536; R. POUND, supra note
32, at 14; W. GREENWOOD, supra, at 151; Pie Powder Courts in Essex, 222 THE LAW TIMES
317 (Dec. 14, 1956) (referring to the merchants as a "scratch jury"). Complaints typically
were tried and resolved on the day the injury in order to accommodate the schedules of the
itinerant traders. Thus the piepoudre courts exercised a very summary procedure. 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *32; Thompson, supra, at 33; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
33, at 536-37; L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra, at 243.
While noted for their efficient, inexpensive administration of justice, the piepoudre courts
were not, strictly speaking, small claims courts, for jurisdiction was not limited to any dollar
amount. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 536; R. POUND, supra note 32, at 14; H.
KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 190 (2d ed. 1956). Moreover, while piepoudre
courts were prevalent in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, R. WALKER & M. WALKER,
THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 47 (2d ed. 1970), they began to decline in the fifteenth century
when the common-law courts began expanding their jurisdiction to include commercial trans-
actions and provided for an appeal by writ of error from the piepoudre courts. See I W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 539; R. WALKER & M. WALKER, supra, at 47. By the eight-
eenth century, the common law incorporated the piepoudre courts' substantive rules of law.
Thompson supra, at 33; R. GRAVESON, EXAMINATION NOTEBOOK OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM
83 (2d ed. 1951); R. WALKER & M. WALKER, supra, at 47. Because the piepoudre courts were
so highly specialized and so uncommon by the late 1700s, they are of little relevance to the
present inquiry.
37. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, 173 n.3 (2d ed. 1959); J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 289-90
(1960). It appears that William the Conqueror introduced the concept of trial by jury into
England to serve as an alternative to forms of factfinding, such as wager of law and trial by
ordeal, which were used in the Anglo-Saxon courts. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A.
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tom of the hierarchy of English courts was a series of local, inferior
courts which focused primarily upon the resolution of small civil dis-
putes. For present purposes, these courts can be divided into three cate-
gories: The ancient communal and feudal courts, the courts of request,
and the new county courts.3 8 The courts of request and new county
courts in particular provide historic precedent for modem juryless small
claim procedures.
A. The Ancient Communal and Feudal Courts
The ancient county, hundred, and manorial courts enjoyed their
greatest popularity in the middle ages, and had declined significantly by
the seventeenth century. 39 During the thirteenth century, judicial inter-
pretations of the Statute of Gloucester 4° had limited these courts' civil
jurisdiction to personal actions involving less than forty shillings,
41
although, at least in the county and manorial courts, actions involving
larger sums or title to real property could be heard through means of a
writ of justicies.42
Most of the available records and studies of the county and hundred
MILLER, supra note 13, at 472; see infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. The early juries
differed considerably from today's impartial finders of fact, but by the end of the fifteenth
century the jury had essentially evolved to its present character. See J. PROFFATr, supra note
25, at 51-52; W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY (1876); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.K.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 472.
It was this "common-law jury" of twelve that most courts found to be preserved in the
state constitutional jury trial guarantees. E.g., Hall v. Brown, 129 Kan. 859, 861, 284 P. 396,
396 (1930); Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 295, 220 N.W. 197, 198 (1928).
38. These were not the only courts in existence that specialized in resolving small mone-
tary claims. For example, some of the borough courts took the form of small debt courts.
These courts used suitors or their equivalents and generally resembled the manorial courts.
See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 149-51; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
37, at 638-39, 643; Thompson, supra note 36, at 16; infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
See generally Fourth Report to His Majesty by the Commissioners on Practice and Proceedings
of the Superior Courts of Common Law app. I (1831-32) [hereinafter Fourth Report] (descrip-
tion of small debt courts existing in 1831).
39. See C. KARRAKER, THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SHERIFF 37 (1930); M. RADIN,
HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERIcAN LEGAL HISTORY 139, 177 (1936).
40. 6 Edw., ch. 8 (1278).
41. J. DAwsoN, supra note 37, at 180; see 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37,
at 530-31 (real actions do not come to the hundred court, and actions are not transmitted to
hundred court by the King's courts).
At least to the extent that these local courts exercised independent jurisdiction, they
tended to apply local, customary law rather than common law. See H. ATHuRs, WiTHoutr
THE LAW 19-21 (1985); M. RADIN, supra note 39, at 178.
42. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 72; Fifth Report to His Majesty by the Commis-
sioners on the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law 9 (1833) [here-
inafter Fifth Report].
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courts focus on their practices in the middle ages. They portray these
communal courts as being presided over by the sheriff or his bailiff.43
Suitors, or doomsmen-local landowners who were required by law to
attend court sessions44-determined and gave the judgment of the
court.45 This judgment was not the equivalent of a jury's verdict; rather,
it dealt primarily with the allotment of proof. After the parties had made
their respective pleadings, the suitors would determine by which of sev-
eral possible methods one of the litigants would have to prove his case:
ordeal, compurgation, wager of law, or duel.46 Thus, the function of the
suitors differed greatly from that of the jury, which developed indepen-
dently in the King's common-law courts.47
The feudal or manorial courts-Courts Baron and Customary
Courts-were in the private hands of manor lords and generally were
presided over by the manor steward. 48 Suitors served as the judges of
these courts, as they did in the county and hundred courts.49
While little information exists concerning the practices of the rela-
tively few county, hundred, and manorial courts that remained active in
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, it appears that
these courts incorporated common-law type juries into their procedures,
in addition to the suitors and other ancient procedures and traditions
which they retained. Juries were used regularly in cases involving title to
land or personal claims of more than forty shillings, which were author-
ized by writ ofjusticies.50 There is some evidence that juries were used at
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *35-36; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 37, at 529. Some of the hundred courts were on private lands. In such cases, the steward
of the manor typically presided over the court. Id. at 530; M. RADIN, supra note 39, at 177.
44. For a comprehensive discussion of the nature and duties of suitors, see R. PALMER,
LAWYER AND DOOMSMAN IN THE OLD ENGLISH COUNTY COURT (1977); Maitland, The
Suitors of the County Court, 11 ENG. HIST. REV. 417 (1888); see also M. RADIN, supra note 39,
at 174.
45. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *36; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
37, at 529-30. See generally R. PALMER, supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., W. MORRIS, THE EARLY ENGLISH COUNTY COURT 111-112 (1926); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 598-603.
47. See I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 139-42, 550; 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 629.
48. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 531, 550-51, 592-94. Courts baron
were said to be held for the freeholders of the manor, while the customary courts were held for
the copyholders. It appears, however, that in many cases the same body served both constitu-
encies. Id. at 593; J. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 197.
49. J. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 196; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at
531, 551, 593. There is some authority suggesting that the steward was the sole judge in the
customary courts. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 181-82; 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 531, 593.
50. C. KARRAKER, supra note 39, at 46-47; W. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 122.
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least occasionally in personal actions involving less than forty shillings,
which were in the regular jurisdiction of these courts,51 but unfortunately
little information exists to demonstrate the prevalence of this practice. It
is clear that the earlier modes of proof-such as compurgation-were
still available as alternative modes of determining questions of fact.
52
Though these ancient courts declined in importance, their official
existence continued until well into the nineteenth century.
5 3
B. The Courts of Requet
The decline in popularity of the county, hundred, and manorial
courts was due to a number of perceived shortcomings, including their
high litigation costs, obsolete, inconvenient methods of trial, slowness,
limited ability to summon witnesses and enforce judgments, and some-
times, unfavorable rules of substantive law.54 By the seventeenth cen-
tury, many small monetary claimants preferred to bring their suits in the
common-law courts.55 While litigants wished to avoid the local courts,
however, bringing or defending suits for small sums in the central com-
mon-law courts was also unsatisfactory. Such suits often entailed
lengthy travel to and from the court and invariably involved high litiga-
tion costs that could not be justified.56 Indeed, as Sir William Holds-
worth notes, the situation was "almost a denial of justice" for poor
persons, for recovery of a small debt had become too inconvenient and
51. See C. KARRAKER, supra note 39, at 46-47 (Karraker speculates that by this time
compurgation and other ancient modes of proof had been almost abandoned and that trial by
jury had become the usual method of proof); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 37, at
593-94; see also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 139 n.1 (suggesting that
suitors transformed into jurors in manorial courts); W. GREENWOOD, supra note 36, at 21-22.
See generally Fifth Report, supra note 42, at 9 (incompetent jurors cited as a problem in hun-
dred courts and courts baron in the 1800s); J. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 181 n.12, 207; M.
MCINTOSH, AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY 196-200 (1986).
52. See, eg., J. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 181; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra
note 37, at 550 ("In the seventeenth century John Smyth could boast of the good justice done
by the free suitors of the hundred of Berkeley where 'there had not been in any age any trials
by jury.' ").
53. Fourth Report, supra note 38, app. I; H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 18; J. DAWSON,
supra note 37, at 232 (manorial courts); M. RADIN, supra note 39, at 177 (hundred court
jurisdiction effectively abolished in 1867); Thompson, supra note 36, at 12-13; see R. POUND,
supra note 32, at 6.
54. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 289 (1949); 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 72-73, 150; C. KARRAKER, supra note 39, at 52; see Cross,
Old English Local Courts and the Movement for their Reform, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 369, 372-73
(1932); Thompson, supra note 36, at 24. These problems only grew worse with time, as is
demonstrated by the Fifth Report, supra note 42, at 6-9; see also T. SNAGGE, EVOLUTION OF
THE COUNTY COURT 8 (1904).
55. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *36-37.
56. See L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra note 36, at 278-79.
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expensive to pursue. 57 An increasingly strong demand arose for courts to
handle small claims-particularly small debts-efficiently and
inexpensively.
5 8
This demand led to creation of the "Court of Requests," or Small
Debtor's Court, in London in 1519. This court was created originally
through an act of Common Council which provided that two aldermen
and five commoners would hold court and determine, in a summary fash-
ion and without a jury, cases of debt under forty shillings. Parliament
confirmed this act of Common Council through statutes in 1604 and
1605. 59
This London court was extremely popular and heavily used. Later
in the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, similar courts of request were created in most principal cities
through special private acts of Parliament. 60 Though it is difficult to de-
termine the precise number, it appears that at least twenty-six acts had
been passed creating courts of request by 1791,61 and that these courts
were handling large numbers of claims.62 By 1846, there were 106 acts in
effect creating 400 courts of request, at which time the courts of request
57. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 188.
58. Id.; L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra note 36, at 279-280; Winder, The Courts of Requests,
52 LAW Q. REV. 369, 369 (1936).
In 1601, Parliament passed a statute attempting to preserve the jurisdiction of the existing
local courts and to discourage "small and trifling suits" clogging the central common-law
courts. An Act to Avoid Trifling or Frivolous Suits in her Majesty's Courts at Westminister,
1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 6. This statute provided that judges could deprive plaintiffs of costs when
they recovered less than forty shillings, and authorized sanctions in some cases for bringing
small claims in the common-law courts. Id.; see I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 73-74.
This statute, however, was ineffective: Litigants, who found the existing local courts unsatis-
factory, found ways to circumvent it and judges were loath to enforce it. J. DAWSON, supra
note 37, at 284; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 74. Thus the problem continued to
grow.
59. See 2 Jac., ch. 14 (1604); An Act for the Recovery of Small Debts, and for the Reliev-
ing of Poor Debtors in London, 1605, 3 Jac., ch. 15. These provisions were refined somewhat
in An Act to Explain and Amend an Act Made in the Third Year of the Reign of King James
the First, entitled, An Act for the Recovering of Small Debts, and for the Delivering of Poor
Debtors in London, 1741, 14 Geo. 2, ch. 10. See H. BLISS, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES
AND JURISDICTIONS OF ALL THE COURTS OF LAW 214-19 (1835); Winder, supra note 58, at
370-71.
60. H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 25-26; Winder, supra note 58, at 369.
61. This number is derived from a list of court of request acts still in force in 1846, when
the courts of request were formally abolished and replaced by the new county courts. See An
Act for the more easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict.,
ch. 95, schedules A & B [hereinafter Chapter 95]. There may have been additional acts passed
that were later repealed and thus are not listed.
62. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 190; Winder, supra note 58, at 379.
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were formally abolished and replaced by the new county courts.
63
The structure and jurisdiction of the courts of request were not uni-
form. Most, however, consisted of several lay persons, called commis-
sioners, who sat once or twice a week to decide cases without a jury,
based on evidence offered by the parties. Procedures were extremely sim-
ple and expenses were trifling; the system was designed for informality
and speed of decision.64
Generally, the court of request's jurisdiction was concurrent with
that of the preexisting local communal and feudal courts. 65 With regard
to the common-law courts, some court of request acts provided that the
court's jurisdiction would be exclusive within the territory covered by the
act.66 In other acts, jurisdiction was concurrent with the common-law
courts, but small claims plaintiffs initiating their suits in the common-law
courts could be deprived of costs, or in some instances might be required
to pay the defendant's costs.67 Cases brought in the courts of request
generally could not be appealed 68 or removed. 69 Earlier court of request
63. H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 26; Winder, supra note 58, at 386-87.
These courts were extremely busy. In 1830, ten of the thirteen busiest local courts were
courts of request, and one court of request in London alone handled almost 30,000 claims in a
single year-nearly one-third of the entire caseload of all the superior courts. H. ARTHURS,
supra note 41, at 26.
64. See H. ARTHuRs, supra note 41, at 26; L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra note 36, at 280;
Winder, supra note 58, at 370.
Unlike in other local courts, see R. PALMER, supra note 44, at 97-153; see supra notes 38-
51 and accompanying text, few lawyers appeared in the courts of request because of the ab-
sence of a system of costs. Indeed, some statutes establishing courts of request actually forbade
the appearance of lawyers. H. ARTHURs, supra note 41, at 43; see also Arthurs, 'Without the
Law" Counts of Local and Special Jurisdiction in Nineteenth Century England, in CUSTOM,
COURTS AND COUNSEL, SELECTED PAPERS OF THE SIXTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CON-
FERENCE 130 (A. Kiralfy, M. Slatter & R. Virgue eds. 1983).
These courts of request should not be confused with the Court of Request created in the
early Tudor period, which was a central court and an off-shoot of the Privy Council. This
court of equity, sometimes known as the "poor man's chancery," was abolished in 1641.
Cross, supra note 54, at 373.
65. Winder, supra note 58, at 374-75.
66. Id. at 375.
67. Id.; see H. ARTHuRS, supra note 41, at 45; Slatter, The Norwich Court ofRequests-A
Tradition Continued, in CUSTOMS, COURTS AND COUNSEL, SELECTED PAPERS OF THE SIXTH
BRrTIsH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 97, 102-03 (A. Kiralfy, M. Slatter & R. Virgue eds.
1983).
68. H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 45; H. BLISS, supra note 59, at 218; 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 33, at 190. One year before the courts of request were terminated and
replaced by the new county courts, Parliament passed a statute permitting superior court re-
view by certiorari in cases involving ten pounds or more. Small Debts Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict.,
ch. 127, § 21.
69. See, e.g., 4 Geo. 3, ch. 40, § 14 (1763); 17 Geo. 3, ch. 15, § 11 (1777); H. ARTHURS,
supra note 41, at 45. After the jurisdiction of courts of request was enlarged, provision for
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acts provided that the commissioners were to proceed according to "eq-
uity and good conscience," but later acts provided that the law should be
followed. 70 When the act provided for decisions in accordance with eq-
uity and good conscience, the commissioners proceeded according to
their own ideas of natural justice; it appears that they were not intended
to, and did not purport to apply Chancery equity.71 Rules of common
law were respected to a certain extent, regardless of whether the applica-
ble act called for good conscience or law, but since most commissioners
were not lawyers, common sense was probably the most frequent touch-
stone.72 Later acts provided for experienced barristers to assist the com-
missioners, and it is likely that under their influence courts of request
followed substantive common law more closely.
73
The scope of actions permitted in courts of request was narrow at
first but expanded over time. The early parliamentary acts only author-
ized actions for debt under forty shillings. "Debt" was construed rather
narrowly,74 and the acts expressly excluded actions for rent, actions
based upon real contracts, and debts arising from a testament or matri-
mony or anything "properly belonging to the ecclesiastical courts. '75
Beginning in 1805, however, Parliament began to broaden the jurisdic-
tion of courts of request to include cases of assumpsit and insimul com-
putasset, quantum meruit, trover and conversion, and trespass and
detinue for goods or chattels taken or detained. Thereafter this broader
jurisdiction became the rule.
76
Also, beginning in 1805, Parliament began to raise the jurisdictional
removal was sometimes made for cases involving sums above a specified amount. See, e.g., 8 &
9 Vict., ch. 127, § 21 (1845) (authorizing removal for suits involving ten pounds or more).
70. Winder, supra note 58, at 375; see, e.g., 4 & 5 Vict., ch. 77, § 24 (1841); 3 Vict., ch.
68, § 20 (1840).
71. One commentator concludes that courts of request "used their wide discretionary
powers. . . . to achieve a genuine blend of communal justice and situation equity." H.
ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 29; see also W. HUTTON, COURTS OF REQUEST (1840); Arthurs,
supra note 64, at 136-137, 140-141.
72. See H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 28-30; Winder, supra note 58, at 375-76, 389-91.
73. See, e.g., 1 & 2 Vict., ch. 90, § 4 (1838); 45 Geo. 3, ch. 67, § 3 (1805).
The fact that many courts of request were not strictly tied to substantive common law
should not invalidate them as precedent for a juryless procedure in modern small claims tribu-
nals. Indeed, while modern small claims courts apply the common law, some are directed in
addition to do "substantial justice" between the parties, in much the same spirit as the old
courts of request. See SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, supra note 3, at 1-2.
74. Winder, supra note 58, at 388-89. For example, "debt" was considered not to include
special actions on the case for breach of agreement or for unliquidated damages. Id.
75. Slatter, supra note 67, at 102; Winder, supra note 58, at 374, 388.
76. 45 Geo. 3, ch. 67, § 16 (1805); Winder, supra note 58, at 389. See Arthurs, supra note
64, at 137-42, for a detailed description of the caseload of several courts of requests during the
period between 1830-1840.
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline -- 39 Hastings L. J. 140 1987-1988
maximum amount-in-controversy, which routinely had been set at forty
shillings. In that year, the court in Bath received jurisdiction to try cases
up to ten pounds.77 The following year, the Grimsby Act fixed the limit
of its court at five pounds 78 and thereafter no more forty-shilling courts
were created. Five pounds became the standard maximum amount-in-
controversy until 1833, when it became customary for Parliament to au-
thorize actions up to fifteen pounds.79 When courts of request were cre-
ated with jurisdiction over cases involving up to fifteen pounds,
Parliament generally provided that the commissioners alone would deter-
mine cases under five pounds, but that a jury would be afforded for cases
above five pounds.
80
The courts of request were controversial from their inception, partly
because they were run by lay persons who often were perceived as inept
or corrupt, and partly because they permitted parties to testify as wit-
nesses on their own behalf, a previously unknown practice which was
feared because it was expected to encourage perjury.81 These and other
77. 45 Geo 3, ch. 67, § 16 (1805); see also Winder, supra note 58, at 388.
78. 46 Geo. 3, ch. 37, § 10 (1806). The Bath and Grimsby Acts both specified that three
commissioners could hear claims under forty shillings, but five commissioners had to be pres-
ent to hear claims above forty shillings. 46. Geo. 3, ch. 37, § 2 (1806); 45 Geo. 3, ch. 67, § 7
(1805); see also 1 & 2 Vict., ch. 90, § 3 (1838).
79. Winder, supra note 58, at 388. This increase in jurisdictional amount apparently was
Parliament's response to pressure from litigants who found the courts of request vastly more
efficient and cost-effective than the ancient local courts and the common-law courts. Id. In-
deed, it was not uncommon for plaintiffs with claims above the jurisdictional limit to abandon
prosecution of the excess in order to avoid having to bring suit in other courts. Id.
80. E.g., Blackburn Act, 1841, 4 & 5 Vict., ch. 77, § 32; Tavistock Act, 3 Vict., ch. 68,
§ 28 (1840); see also Winder, supra note 58, at 381.
81. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 190; Winder, supra note 58, at 372.
Courts of request were also criticized because of their "lack of judicial strength and their
inability to enforce due execution of their own process, or compel the attendance of witnesses,"
T. SNAGGE, supra note 54, at 8, and because "persons of quality" were compelled "to submit
for small debts to a company of shopkeepers." Winder, supra note 58, at 372. See generally
Fifth Report, supra note 42, at 11-12 (summarizing perceived problems with the courts of
request); Cross, supra note 54, at 375-85; Keane, The Small Debts Act, 36 LAW MAG. 189,
194-95 (1846).
Blackstone acknowledged the need for small claims courts to dispense quick, inexpensive
justice, but did not feel that the courts of request were the answer.
The time and expense of obtaining this summary redress are very inconsiderable,
which make it a great benefit to trade.... But it is to be feared, that the [courts of
request may] be attended in time with very ill consequences: as the method of pro-
ceeding therein is entirely in derogation of the common law; as their large discretion-
ary powers create a petty tyranny in a set of standing commissioners; and as the
disuse of the trial by jury may tend to estrange the minds of the people from that
valuable prerogative of Englishmen, which has already been more than sufficiently
excluded in many instances. How much rather is it to be wished, that the proceed-
ings in the county and hundred courts could again be revived, without burthening
the freeholders with too frequent and tedious attendances; and at the same time re-
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sources of dissatisfaction persisted despite the heavy use of these courts.
Ultimately, in 1846, Parliament responded by repealing all the court of
request acts and creating the new county courts.
82
C. The New County Courts
The new county courts differed from the old courts 83 in virtually
every respect except name and purpose. Like the courts of request, the
new county courts were especially designed to provide cheap and efficient
justice.
84
To ensure convenience, the act creating the new county courts
called for an extensive network of courts across England. The Act fur-
ther required that judges be experienced barristers.85 The Act directed
that the new courts be conducted without formal pleadings, "in a sum-
mary way, ' ' 86 and that they continue the tradition of denying a jury in
suits for very small amounts. 87 When the amount-in-controversy was
moving the delays that have insensibly crept into their proceedings, and the power
that either party have of transferring at pleasure their suits to the courts at
Westminster!
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *81-83. Blackstone favored the emulation of a statute
passed in 1749 to upgrade the County Court of Middlesex. This upgraded court had jurisdic-
tion over cases under forty shillings and provided a trained barrister to administer the court
and a jury of twelve freeholders, summoned by rotation. Id. at *82-83; see also L. CROSS & J.
HAND, supra note 36, at 280; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 191-92.
82. Chapter 95, supra note 61; see L. CRoss & J. HAND, supra note 36, at 280-82; Cross,
supra note 54, at 375-85; Winder, supra note 58, at 383.
83. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text. In 1846, the new county court act
replaced not only the courts of request but the old county courts as well. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 95
(1846); Thompson, supra note 36, at 13.
84. The 1846 new county courts act stated:
[W]hereas the County Court is a Court of ancient Jurisdiction having Cognizance of
all Pleas of Personal Actions to any Amount by virtue of a Writ of Justicies issued in
that Behalf: And whereas the Proceedings in the County Court are dilatory and
expensive, and it is expedient to alter and regulate the Manner of proceeding in the
said Courts for the Recovery of Small Debts and Demands [i.e., the Courts of Re-
quests], and that the Courts established under the recited Acts of Parliament ...
should be holden after the passing of this Act as Branches of the County Court [it
was enacted that certain county courts of the new model would be established]....
Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 1; see also B. O'DONNELL, CAVALCADE OF JUSTICE 202 (1952).
85. Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 9; see B. O'DONNELL, supra note 84, at 203.
86. Chapter 95, supra note 61, §§ 58, 74; see also L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra note 36, at
282. For a brief description of the procedure in the new county courts, see Cautherley, The
County Court System, 7 LAW Q. REV. 346 (1891).
87. The Act provided:
[Tihe Judge of the County Court shall be the sole Judge in all Actions brought in the
said Court, and shall determine all Questions as well of Fact as of Law, unless a Jury
shall be summoned as herein-after mentioned. . . . [I]n all Actions where the
Amount claimed shall exceed Five Pounds it shall be lawful for the Plaintiff or De-
fendant to require a Jury to be summoned to try the said Action; and in all Actions
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less than five pounds, there was no right to a jury; the judge was directed
to decide such cases by himself, although he could, at his discretion, or-
der a jury for a particular case. A five-member jury was provided for
cases involving more than five pounds. 88 In a case involving less than
five pounds, the defendant could not obtain a jury by removal to another
court because removal was prohibited.89 Nor was there any right to a
jury on appeal from the new county courts, since there was no appeal in
any case involving less than twenty pounds.90
The initial jurisdiction of the new county courts extended to all per-
sonal actions where the debt or damage did not exceed twenty pounds,
except in actions for ejectment, will contests, slander, libel, and a few
other exceptions. 91 The new county courts proved very popular,92 and in
where the Amount claimed shall not exceed Five Pounds it shall be lawful for the
Judge, in his Discretion, on the Application of either of the Parties, to order that
such Action be tried by a Jury....
Chapter 95, supra note 61, §§ 69, 70; see also C. POLLOCK, THE PRACTICE OF THE CotmTY
CoumRs 2, 48 (1851).
88. See supra note 87; Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 73:
[Whenever there are any Jury Trials Five Jurymen shall be impanelled and sworn,
as Occasion shall require, to give their Verdicts in the Causes which shall be brought
before them in the said Court... and either of the Parties to any such Cause shall be
entitled to his lawful Challenge against all or any of the said Jurors in like Manner as
he would be entitled in any Superior Court; and the Jurymen so sworn shall be re-
quired to give an unanimous Verdict.
Since many state jury trial guarantees have been construed to preserve the right to a
"common-law" jury of twelve, see supra note 37, an interesting question arises regarding the
ramifications of a jury of five in the new county courts. It might be argued that since the new
county courts did not afford a common-law jury of twelve, all of their proceedings were 'jury-
less" for purposes of state constitutional jury trial guarantees. But see infra note 126.
89. Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 90. If the claim exceeded five pounds, removal was only
possible by leave of a judge of a superior court "and upon such Terms as to Payment of Costs,
giving Security for Debt or Costs, or such other Terms as he shall think fit." Id
While the plaintiff might initially choose to bring suit in one of the superior courts in
order to obtain a jury, id. § 117, he could be denied costs if he recovered a verdict for less than
twenty pounds in a contract action, or less than five pounds in a tort action. If he lost his
action he might be compelled to pay the defendant's attorney fees. Id. § 129.
90. Id. § 89; see also id. § 108 ("[No Judgment or Execution shall be stayed, delayed, or
reversed upon or by any Writ of Error, or Supersedeas thereon, to be sued for the reversing of
any Judgment given in any Court holden under the Provisions of this Act."); C. POLLOCK,
supra note 87, at 118.
91. Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 58:
[AII Pleas of Personal Actions, where the Debt or Damage claimed is not more than
Twenty Pounds, whether on Balance of Account or otherwise, may be holden in the
County Court, without Writ;... Provided always, that the Court shall not have
cognizance of any Action of Ejectment, or in which the Title to any corporeal or
incorporeal Hereditaments, or to any Toll, Fair, Market, or Franchise, shall be in
question, or in which the Validity of any Demise, Bequest, or Limitation under any
Will or Settlement may be disputed, or for any malicious Prosecution, or for any
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1850, only four years after the original act was passed, Parliament passed
another act expanding the courts' jurisdiction to debts or damages not
exceeding fifty pounds.93 By 1867, Parliament had authorized certain
contract and tort actions initiated in a superior court to be remitted to
the county courts at the instance of the defendant.94 Moreover, once the
1846 Act was in place, Parliament regularly added new causes of action
to the county court jurisdiction.95 The restrictions on access to jury re-
mained, and the general trend in England since that time has been to
further restrict the right to jury.
96
D. Summary
It appears that throughout the period relevant to our present in-
quiry, England had a system of small claims courts to resolve small mon-
etary disputes without recourse to a jury at any point in the proceedings.
This practice was grounded in the pragmatic realization that the jury
process, notwithstanding its other merits, was too time consuming and
expensive to be productive in resolving very small monetary claims. The
amount at stake could not justify the personal expense to the parties, or
the time of jurors and allocation of judicial resources.
97
Libel or Slander, or for Criminal Conversation or for Seduction, or Breach of Prom-
ise of Marriage.
Cf id. § 122 (clarifying that landlords could seek possession of small tenements when the value
of the premises or the rent payable did not exceed fifty pounds per year).
92. See L. CROSS & J. HAND, supra note 36, at 280-82; T. SNAGGE, supra note 54, at 14-
15.
93. An Act to Extend the Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands
in England, and to Amend the Same, 1850, 13 & 14 Vict., ch. 61. In increasing the jurisdiction
of the county courts from twenty pounds to fifty pounds, the 1850 amendment provided that
an appeal could be taken for claims involving more than twenty pounds. Id. § 14.
94. See 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 142, § 7 (1867); Cautherley, supra note 86, at 347.
95. E.g., 28 & 29 Viet., ch. 99 (1865) (equity jurisdiction); 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 142, § 11
(1867) (actions of ejectment and actions in which title to land was involved, when the annual
value of the premises did not exceed 20 pounds); 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 71 (1868) (admiralty
jurisdiction).
96. See, e.g., R. WALKER & M. WALKER, supra note 36, at 188-90.
97. The English practice of resolving small civil claims without a jury is comparable to
the English practice of convicting persons of petty criminal offenses in a summary fashion,
reserving the jury for "grave and infamous" crimes. See Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89,
94-95 (1862); State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 600 (1880); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at
*280; J. PROFFATT, supra note 25, § 95, at 135-36.
Summary prosecution for petty offenses was justified as being "for the greater ease of the
subject, by doing him speedy justice, and by not harassing the freeholders with frequent and
troublesome attendances to try every minute offence." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at
*280-81; see also Glenn, 54 Md. at 605 (if petty offenders "could only be reached by formal
indictment and trial by jury in the criminal Courts of the State, the formality and delay attend-
ing that mode of proceeding would either operate as an immunity to that class of offenders, or
an oppression of them in many cases"); Katz v. Eldredge, 97 N.J.L. 123, 151, 117 A. 841, 852
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I. The Right to Jury in the American Colonies and
Territories during the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and
Nineteenth Centuries
A. Colonial and Territorial Practices
The earliest colonial settlers had a simple society and correspond-
ingly unsophisticated courts which delivered justice of a "rude, popular,
summary kind."98 Trial by jury appeared early in the colonies,99 but the
settlers also were quick to establish special juryless tribunals for expedi-
tious determination of small monetary claims, generally of forty shillings
or less. 100
(1922) ("[T]he theory, as I understand it, which gave rise to the distinction at common law
and in subsequent statutes, is that the convenience and benefit to the public resulting from a
prompt and inexpensive trial and punishment of violations of petty and trivial police power
regulations are more important than the comparatively small prejudice to the individual result-
ing from his being deprived of the safeguard of indictment before having to answer and of trial
by a jury when held to answer"); J. PROFFATr7, supra note 25, § 95, at 135. This practical
reasoning accompanied English colonial settlers and established itself in the United States.
See, e.g., Glenn, 54 Md. at 602: ("With us there has been no time since the earliest days of the
colony that the summary jurisdiction by justices of the peace has not been exercised, in one
form or another, over parties offending against the peace and good order of society. This
jurisdiction has been exercised, sometimes under British statutes in force here, but more gener-
ally under statutes passed by the Colonial and State Legislatures."); Byers v. Commonwealth,
42 Pa. 89, 96 (1862). The distinction between grave and petty offenses for purposes of a right
to jury was incorporated into the constitutional right to jury trial in criminal actions in many
American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pa., 418 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1974); People v.
Oppenheimer 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 4, 116 Cal. Rptr. 795 passim (1974); Reed v. State, 470
So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 1985). There seems little reason to adopt the practical English practice
in petty criminal actions and reject it in petty civil cases.
98. Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORY 367 (1907), first published in If BULL. U. Wis. 7 (1899).
99. See, e.g., Reinsch, supra note 98; R. POUND, supra note 32, at 27-30; L. MOORE, THE
JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 99-100 (1973). Unfortunately, relatively
little has been discovered or published about jury practices in colonial American courts. See
Wolfram, supra note 19, at 732 n.271. Of the few early court records which have survived,
fewer still have been researched or published. Lacking the opportunity to engage in original
research, this author must depend upon the few published reports that exist.
100. See, e.g., R. POUND, supra note 32, at 30-32 (juryless small claims tribunals in the
colony of Massachusetts), 41-42 (juryless small claims tribunals in the colony of New York),
43-46 (juryless small claims tribunals in the colonies of New Jersey); J. PROFFArr, supra note
25, § 99, at 142.
Several scholars have suggested that most early settlers patterned their colonial courts
after the English local courts with which they were most familiar, rather than after the central
common-law courts. See, e.g., Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century
New England, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 416 (1931); J. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 233. As noted
above, the old county, hundred, and manor courts appear to have incorporated juries into their
procedures by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See supra notes 39-58 and accompany-
ing text. It seems unlikely that the English courts of request had much influence on the devel-
opment of the earliest American juryless small claims courts, since the courts of request, did
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As the colonies progressed into the eighteenth century-a time more
directly relevant to the present inquiry--colonial court systems became
relatively sophisticated.101 While each colony's court system was unique,
each nevertheless followed the basic English pattern of maintaining sepa-
rate tribunals to handle specified categories of disputes, including tribu-
nals for expeditious handling of small monetary claims. 102
Civil jurisdiction over small debts, which had resided in the English
courts of request, county, hundred, manor, and borough courts, 103 usu-
ally was vested in justices of the peace in the colonies. 104 Justice of the
peace jurisdiction was statutorily prescribed and limited to relatively
small amounts-in-controversy. 1 5 In most jurisdictions, justice of the
peace courts operated without a jury10 6 and without technical forms of
pleading. 107 Their purpose in civil matters, like that of the English
courts of request and new county courts, was to give quick, convenient,
inexpensive summary resolution of small monetary claims.
not become prevalent until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See generally supra notes
57-61 and accompanying text. Accordingly, English precedent for early American juryless
procedures is uncertain.
101. See Reinsch, supra note 98, at 370; R. POUND, supra note 32, at 4, 23, 58; Aumann,
Some Problems of Growth and Development in the Formative Period of the American Legal
System, 1775-1866, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 382, 382-83 (1939).
102. See R. POUND, supra note 32, at 58-90; White v. Kendrick, 1 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 469,
472 (S.C. 1805).
103. See supra notes 32-97 and accompanying text.
104. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17 (1898); Steele, supra note 1, at 326; R.
POUND, supra note 32, at 86-88. While justices of the peace also existed in England, they
exercised only administrative and criminal jurisdiction. The American colonies adopted the
concept of the English justice of the peace but added jurisdiction over small civil claims. Spe-
cial Project, Model Statute, supra note 9, at 717; Surrency, The Courts in the American Colo-
nies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 253 (1967).
For a description of other varieties of colonial and post revolution American small claims
courts, see R. POUND, supra note 32, at 83-90, 150-56, 187-93, 245-46.
105. See, e.g., In re Thorne, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 335, 337-38, 93 A. 557, 558 (1915) (provi-
sional authority of justice of the peace to punish assaults and batteries by fines not to exceed
$10); Herrell v. Simpson, 175 Tenn. 154, 156-57, 133 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1939) (power of justice
of the peace is subject to the will of the legislature); Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 18-19,
194 A. 354, 357-58 (1937) (jurisdiction of the justice of the peace is subject to legislative con-
trol); 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 11, 26, 33 (1967).
106. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17 (1898); Norton v. McLeary, 8 Ohio
St. 205, 208-09 (1858). A few state statutes provided for a jury of six or twelve injustice of the
peace courts. See infra note 126. When an argument has been raised that a constitutional
right to jury exists for a case brought in one of these justice of the peace courts, courts often
have found that the justice of the peace jury did not satisfy that right, either because only six
jurors were provided rather than the 12 jurors of the traditional "common-law" jury, or be-
cause the justice of the peace lacked adequate supervisory powers over the jury. See Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. at 38-39; supra note 36.
107. See Steele, supra note 1, at 326-27; 51 C.J.S. supra note 105, §§ 53, 54.
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The justices of the peace generally were persons untrained in the
law. They had considerable discretion and were not closely supervised
by higher authorities. 10 8 The colonial, and later the state, legislative bod-
ies routinely provided for appellate review through the superior courts.
This appeal generally took the form of a trial de novo,10 9 complete with
right to jury.110 Many states, however, conditioned this right to an ap-
peal or trial de novo-and thus access to a jury-on a minimum thresh-
old amount-in-controversy. For example, in 1795, Ohio territorial law
provided that a single justice of the peace should hear debts and demands
of under five dollars without jury and without appeal.III In 1799 and
1800, the First General Assembly of the Northwest Territory passed stat-
utes raising the justice of the peace jurisdiction to twenty dollars, and
provided for an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in the form of a
trial de novo with jury, from judgments in excess of two dollars.1 12 This
practice continued until after the adoption of the Ohio Constitution
when, in 1804, the Second General Assembly of the new State of Ohio
raised the justice of the peace jurisdiction to thirty-five dollars and raised
the threshold amount required to obtain an appeal and access to a jury,
to five dollars.
1 13
As early as 1642, Virginia statutes provided for summary adjudica-
108. See Steele, supra note 1, at 326-28; Special Project, Model Statute, supra note 9, at
717-18.
109. A trial de novo was necessary at least in part because the justice of the peace gener-
ated no written transcript. See Steele, supra note 1, at 326-28, 332-33.
110. See R. POUND, supra note 32, at 150, 251; Steele, supra note 1, at 326, 332-33. Apart
from any notions the colonists might have had concerning a natural right to jury, they appar-
ently viewed a jury as necessary in such cases in order to counteract the perceived corruption
and incompetence of justices of the peace. See R. POUND, supra note 32, at 251.
111. The statutes specifically provided that no other court would have cognizance of debts
or demands under five dollars. A Law for the Easy and Speedy Recovery of Small Debt, 1795,
ch. 40, §§ 1, 2, OHIO STAT. (I Chase (1833)). Justice of the peace courts operated without a
jury, see Norton v. McLeary, 8 Ohio St. 205, 208-09 (1858), so there was no access to a jury for
such claims.
112. An Act Establishing Courts for the Trial of Small Causes, 1799, ch. 100, OHIO STAT.
(1 Chase 233 (1833)); An Act Supplementary to the Act, Entitled, 'An Act Establishing
Courts for the Trial of Small Causes,' 1800, ch. 162, § 3, OHIO STAT. (1 Chase 308 (1833)).
Section 14 of the 1799 Act specified that defendants could appeal judgments exceeding two
dollars. Plaintiffs could appeal judgments against them when their original demands exceeded
two dollars. They could appeal judgments in their favor when their original demand exceeded
their recovery by four dollars or more. Section 20 provided exceptions to the small claims
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, which included "debt on bonds for the performance of
covenants, actions of covenant, actions of replevin, or upon any real contract," certain actions
of trespass, and all actions in which the title to land was in question.
113. An Act Regulating the Duties of Justices of the Peace and Constables, in criminal
and Civil Cases, 1804, ch. 47, §§ 5, 15, OHIO STAT. (1 Chase 429, 430 (1833)). Section 15
provided that a defendant could appeal a judgment exceeding five dollars. Plaintiff could ap-
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tion of debts under twenty shillings, or two hundred pounds of tobacco,
by a single magistrate, with no jury or appeal.' 1 4 Statutes in effect when
Virginia adopted its first constitution preserved this jurisdiction in a sin-
gle justice of the peace," l5 and further provided that justices of the
county court could determine all suits for "debt or demand due by judg-
ment, or obligation or account" from twenty-five shillings, or two hun-
dred pounds of tobacco, to five pounds, or one thousand pounds of
tobacco, "without the solemnity of a jury."'"1 6 A similar provision ex-
isted for actions of detinue or trover under five pounds.' 17 Likewise,
Kentucky justices of the peace made final determinations of claims up to
five pounds with no right to jury in all cases of debt, trover, and
conversion. 1 18
When the first state constitution was adopted in Pennsylvania, jus-
tices of the peace had jurisdiction to try debts of up to five pounds with-
out a jury. Their determination was final for all actions involving less
than forty shillings." 19 A jury was made available on appeal when the
action involved over forty shillings. Later, in 1794, a statute increased
the justice of the peace jurisdiction to twenty pounds and made the jus-
tice's determination final for all cases involving less than five pounds,
120
thus diminishing the right to jury as it existed when the state's constitu-
tion was adopted.
In 1644, the Colony of Connecticut provided that actions involving
less than forty shillings would be tried by the court of magistrates with-
peal a judgment against him when his original demand exceeded five dollars or when he won,
but his original demand exceeded the sum recovered by five dollars.
In the following years the justice of the peace jurisdiction was raised to $50, and then to
$100. In 1820 the right to appeal was extended to all cases. An Act Defining the Duties of
Justices of the Peace and Constables in Criminal and Civil Cases, 1820, ch. 475, §§ 5, 18, OHIO
STAT. (2 Chase at 1116, 1119 (1833)); see also Norton, 8 Ohio St. at 209 (1854 act extends
jurisdiction to $300; appeal lies from extended jurisdiction).
114. 2 COLONY LAWS OF VIRGINIA 1642-60, 272-73 (Act 56, 1642-43); see id. at 462 (Act
63, 1657); G. WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 12, 120
(1736).
115. An Act for Establishing County Courts and Regulating and Settling the Proceedings
Therein, 1751, ch. 4, § 5 (Acts of the Assembly of the Colony of Virginia, 1769) [hereinafter
Chapter 4]. This statute provided that a single justice of the peace could resolve causes involv-
ing less than 25 shillings or 200 pounds of tobacco.
116. Id. § 21.
117. Id. §22.
118. See Singleton v. Madison, 4 Ky. (I Bibb) 342, 344 (1809); Harrison v. Chiles, 13 Ky.
(3 Litt.) 194, 199-200 (1823).
119. Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 415, 425-26 (Pa. 1808).
120. This action was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Emerick, 1 Binn. at
416; see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
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out jury.121 An appeal was later provided for in the county court, but the
statute granting the appeal expressly withheld access to a jury.122 By
1769, after several variations in jurisdiction,1 23 justices of the peace were
authorized to hear cases involving up to five pounds without a jury or a
right to appeal. 124 In 1795, the final jurisdiction of the justices of the
peace was set at seven dollars, and this limitation on access to a jury was
in effect when the Connecticut Constitution was adopted, and for half a
century thereafter. 12
5
Some colonies and territories apparently did provide a jury for every
small debt claim, regardless of the amount involved.126 Nevertheless, it
is clear that the practice of many colonies and territories at the time they
adopted their constitutions was to provide juryless proceedings to ensure
efficient resolution of claims involving less than a specified amount. In
those jurisdictions which look, under the historical test, to their own co-
lonial or territorial practice in order to define the constitutional right to a
121. Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 55 (1867).
122. NEW HAVEN AND CONNECTICUT COLONY LAWS 1639-1673; THE GENERAL LAWS
AND LIBERTIES OF CONNECTICUT COLONIE: REVISED AND PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE
GENERAL COURT, 1672, 13, 37.
123. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
124. Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 55 (1867).
125. Id.
126. Tennessee is an example. See, eg., An Act to Amend' an Act Establishing Courts of
Law, and for Regulating Proceedings Therein,' 1794, ch. 1, §§ 52, 54, reprinted in LAWS OF
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE (1803); Morford v. Barnes, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 444, 446 (1835); see
also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 26 (1898) (jury provided in county court for
appeal from justice of the peace decision). A few states, like New York and Georgia, compro-
mised by providing for a small jury in the justice of the peace court itself. See, e.g., De Lamar
v. Dollar, 128 Ga. 57, 61, 57 S.E. 85, 87 (1907) ("All cases tried before a justice of the peace
were subject to be appealed to a jury in that court consisting of five jurors, whose verdict was
final and conclusive between the parties."); People ex reL Metropolitan Board of Health v.
Lane, 6 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 105, 119-126 (1869) (jury of six in small claims court, with no further
access to jury).
It is interesting to note that when the relevant New York constitutional jury trial guaran-
tee was adopted, it provided a jury of six in the inferior court for all matters under $100 and no
further jury through appeal. Later provisions raised the amount of the court's jurisdiction, but
for claims exceeding the original $100 limit, parties had a right to remove the case to a court in
which a jury of 12 was available. Since the constitutionally guaranteed right to jury was con-
strued to be a right to a traditional common-law jury of twelve, People ex rel Metropolitan
Board of Health, 6 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) at 120; Baxter v. Putney, 37 How. Pr. 140, 143 (N.Y.
County Ct. 1868), it appears that the New York courts did not view the provisions of a jury of
six in the inferior court as satisfying the general constitutional right. See People ex rel. Metro-
politan Board of Health, 6 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) at 125; Baxter, 37 How. Pr. at 143-44; supra note
103. Nonetheless, New York case law suggests that the right to a jury of six in the small
claims court was preserved under the state's constitutional jury trial guarantee. Knight v.
Campbell, 62 Barb. 16, 25-27 (N.Y. Ch. 1872); see De Lamar, 128 Ga. at 61-62, 57 S.E. at 87
(right to jury of five preserved on appeal in the justice court under 1798 constitution).
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jury, such history would support the use of juryless small claims proce-
dures today.
B. Special Constitutional Provisions
Most state constitutions merely require that the right to jury be
"preserved" or "remain inviolate," 127 and thus give no guidance concern-
ing their framers' specific understanding about the right to jury for small
monetary claims. A few state guarantees, however, do make specific pro-
vision for small monetary claims. Of these states' constitutions, several
parallel the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution and
expressly limit the constitutional right to jury to cases involving more
than a specified amount-in-controversy. 128 While little legislative history
of the framers' intent exists, one can infer from their inclusion of a mini-
mum amount-in-controversy that the framers were aware of the imprac-
ticality of offering a jury for very small monetary claims and intended
that such claims be resolved without a jury. 129 Undoubtedly, the mini-
mum amounts specified were deemed appropriate for that particular pe-
riod in history-indeed, in some cases the constitutionally specified
minimum may have exceeded the ceiling currently being imposed on
juryless proceedings in the state.
1 30
In contrast, three state constitutions expressly provide that the right
127. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
128. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16 ("In civil cases where the amount-in-controversy
exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is preserved to the same
extent as it existed at common law."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("In suits at common law
where the value in controversy shall exceed one thousand dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved."); MD. CONST. Dec. of Rts., art. 23 ("The right of trial by Jury of all issues of
fact in civil proceedings in the Several Courts of law in this State, where the amount-in-contro-
versy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably preserved."); N.H. CoNST.,
pt. I, art. 20 ("In all controversies concerning property-and in all suits between two or more
persons, except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and practiced, and
except in cases in which the value in controversy does not exceed five hundred dollars, and title
of real estate is not concerned, the parties have a right to a trial by jury."); OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 19 ("The right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein
the amount-in-controversy does not exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), or in criminal
cases wherein punishment for the offense charged is by fine only, not exceeding One Hundred
Dollars ($100.00)."); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13 ("In suits at common law, where the value
in controversy exceeds $20 exclusive of interest and costs, the right of trial by jury, if required
by either party, shall be preserved; and in such suit in a court of limited jurisdiction a jury shall
consist of six persons.").
129. See Iowa Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1981).
130. The problem, of course, is that by stating a specific minimum amount-in-controversy,
the framers may have precluded the state legislature from adjusting the amount periodically to
account for such things as changes in the value of money and changes in the cost of jury trial
litigation. See infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text. Thus, the original minimum
amount-in-controversy, while effective when enacted, may over time have served to defeat the
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to jury will be preserved "in all cases at law, without regard to the
amount-in-controversy." 131 The wording of these provisions suggests
that the framers were aware of the practice of providing juryless proceed-
ings for small monetary claims and decided to prohibit it expressly.
Finally, some state constitutional guarantees provide that the right
to jury will remain inviolate, but that the legislature may provide for
juries of less than twelve in "inferior" courts or courts "not of record."'
132
Such provisions suggest that the framers were aware of the practical
problems posed by juries in the kinds of small cases that often are rele-
gated to "inferior courts" or courts "not of record," and wished to give
the legislature flexibility to regulate jury trials in such tribunals to ensure
efficiency. Since these provisions only purport to preserve the existing
right to jury, they are not inconsistent with the outright denial of access
to a jury for the smallest monetary claims.
IV. The Effect of Concurrent Jurisdiction in Juryless Small
Claims Tribunals and Common-Law Courts
The judicial procedures outlined in the preceding sections demon-
strate that during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries
an understanding existed both in England and in many of the American
colonies and territories that special provisions could and should be made
to resolve small monetary claims without the right to a jury at any stage
of the proceedings. These provisions were needed to provide practical,
useful remedies for persons with very small claims. Under the historical
test 33 for the extent of the state constitutional right to jury, this early
practice of resolving small claims without a jury would justify compara-
ble juryless procedures today.
original intent by mandating provision of a jury in cases in which it could not be justified in
practical terms.
Some states have responded to the problem by amending their constitutions to set forth a
larger minimum amount-in-controversy. Thus, Maryland originally provided for a minimum
amount-in-controversy of five dollars (MD. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1851, repealed 1864)), but
subsequently raised the amount to $500. In its 1877 constitution, New Hampshire provided
for a minimum amount-in-controversy of $100, which it raised to $500 in 1960. N.H. Const.
pt. I, art. 20; see also MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1352-55, 1421-26 (Mar. 1965) (Delegates debate the propriety of naming a spe-
cific minimum amount-in-controversy, noting that any such sum will become outdated, but
ultimately decide to include a specified sum with the understanding that it can be increased
later through constitutional amendment.)
131. See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; Wisc. CONST. art. I, § 5.
132. See, eg., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; IowA CoNsT. art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7.
133. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, certain circumstances complicate the determination of
the right to a jury under the historical test. One complication concerns
those states where juryless tribunals had concurrent jurisdiction over
small claims with courts that afforded a jury. Certainly a case that could
only have been tried through a juryless procedure during the applicable
time period, due to its small amount-in-controversy, would not be consti-
tutionally entitled to a jury today. 134 Even where small claims courts
had concurrent jurisdiction with courts providing a common-law jury of
twelve, no absolute right to jury need be inferred. Rather, the right to
jury will depend upon the circumstances under which the small claim is
brought. Claims brought in the modern equivalent of the early small
claims tribunal 35 carry no constitutionally guaranteed right to jury sim-
ply because those same claims could be brought in courts that provided a
jury during the applicable historic period.
While courts have had relatively few occasions to address this issue,
they have reached similar conclusions in comparable contexts. For ex-
ample, in C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore,136 the Supreme Court noted that
prior to the adoption of the seventh amendment and thereafter, both in
England and in the colonies, the admiralty courts and the common-law
courts had concurrent jurisdiction to give in rem judgments for forfeiture
of property seized on the high seas. When actions for forfeiture were
brought in the common-law courts they were determined by a jury,
13 7
but when they were brought in the admiralty court there was no right to
jury. 138 This observation led the Court to conclude that the constitu-
tional guarantee of the right to jury trial only preserved the right for
those forfeiture actions brought pursuant to the common-law proce-
dure.139 Similarly, common-law courts and equity courts historically
had concurrent jurisdiction to try actions for an accounting, even though
only a money judgment was sought. As a result, the constitutional right
134. See Research Hospital v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 352 Ill. 510, 521-22,
186 N.E. 170, 175 (1933).
135. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
136. 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
137. Id. at 139-43.
138. Id. at 141, 152. Indeed, the King originally created jurisdiction in the admiralty
courts in order "to have a forum not controlled by the obstinate resistance of American ju-
ries." Id. at 141.
139. Id. at 153; see also Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764 (1867)
(right to jury trial in seizures on land; seizures on the high seas must be tried in admiralty);
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 301, 231 P.2d 832, 844 (1951) (no right
to jury trial in admiralty).
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to jury only extends to actions brought pursuant to common law.140
It follows that where common-law courts had concurrent jurisdic-
tion with summary procedure small claims courts to try small monetary
disputes, the constitutional guarantee only preserves the status quo. Par-
ties retain the right to jury if the claim was brought in a common-law
court, but the constitutional guarantee creates no new jury trial right for
cases brought in tribunals similar to the small claims court which histori-
cally afforded no right to jury.
One might question whether such reasoning would be consistent
with recent United States Supreme Court rulings that have expanded the
seventh amendment right to jury. In a trio of cases, Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 141 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 142 and Ross v. Bern-
hard, 143 the Supreme Court has taken an expansive approach for deter-
mining when common-law or equitable jury procedures should govern a
case. The Court has held that courts must determine the legal or equita-
ble nature of each issue to be tried, and provide a jury for all issues that
are "legal" in nature and for all issues common to both a legal and equi-
table remedy. Federal courts may not, therefore, determine the right to
jury based upon the overall nature or "gist" of the action; the equitable
bench trial thus is limited to those issues historically within the exclusive
substantive jurisdiction of equity.
Were this reasoning carried over to small monetary claims, a right
to jury would almost always be found. There are several reasons, how-
ever, why the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Dairy
Queen, and Ross is irrelevant to the question of a right to jury for issues
brought pursuant to the summary procedures of a small claims court.
First, of course, these Supreme Court decisions concern the seventh
amendment and do not control the states' interpretation of their own
140. See Board of Supervisors v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 210, 215-16 (1866); H.B. Zachry Co. v.
Terry, 195 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1952).
Indeed, the rule has arisen that if the accounts are sufficiently complex, the court should
try the action as a suit in equity. The common-law remedy is deemed inadequate because it is
impractical for a jury to attempt to sort out lengthy, detailed accounts. See H.B. Zachry Co.,
195 F.2d at 189; Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 455-57, 369 S.W.2d. 741, 742-43
(1962). Cf Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (while an action for an
accounting could be deemed equitable for purposes of the right to jury trial when the accounts
are too complex for jurors to determine, the court's power to appoint special masters to assist
the jury should render the legal remedy adequate in most cases and when adequate, the com-
mon-law procedure, with jury, should be used).
141. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
142. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
143. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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constitutional provisions. 14 4 Second, even if the states do adopt the
Supreme Court's reasoning in the equity or common law context,
1 45
there is little justification for extending it to the common law small
claims court context. The decisions in Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen,
and Ross were based on the understanding that courts of equity tradition-
ally have afforded no remedy when an adequate remedy exists at law. 146
The Court reasoned that if an adequate legal remedy exists today, the
issues relevant to that remedy should be tried by a jury because a court of
equity in 1791 would have abandoned jurisdiction of those issues capable
of resolution at law.
This special relationship between common-law courts and courts of
equity never existed between common-law courts and juryless small
claims tribunals. Indeed, when remedies were available simultaneously
in both tribunals, the prevailing practice not only permitted summary
relief in the juryless small claims tribunals but strongly encouraged it: in
some jurisdictions there were laws expressly penalizing the litigant who
persisted in seeking the common-law procedure for a small monetary
claim. 147 The very purpose of the small claims courts was to provide the
kind of relief the common-law courts provided-money judgments-
through a procedure simplified to accommodate the small amount-in-
controversy.
In two cases in which common-law courts and other specialized,
juryless tribunals have had concurrent jurisdiction, it appears that the
Supreme Court itself has recognized that the reasoning of Beacon Thea-
tres, Dairy Queen, and Ross does not determine the right to jury trial
144. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
145. In fact, a substantial percentage of the states that have addressed the issue appear to
reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Beacon Theaters, Dairy Queen, and Ross See, e.g.,
Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 91-92, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358-59 (1975); State v.
Cahill, 443 A.2d 497, 500 (Del. 1982); First Nat'l Bank of Olathe v. Clark, 226 Kan. 619, 621-
23, 602 P.2d 1299, 1302-03 (1979); Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. App. 1982);
Apollo v. Kim Anh Pham, 192 N.J. Super. 427, 431, 470 A.2d 934, 936-37 (1983); Pelfrey v.
Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 693-95, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316-17 (1978). Of course, a number of
state courts have opted to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead. See, e.g., Finance,
Inv. & Rediscount Co. v. Weis, 409 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Ala. 1982); Shope v. Sims, 658 P.2d
1336, 1340 (Alaska 1983); Harada v. Bums, 50 Haw. 528, 534-36, 445 P.2d 376, 381-82
(1968); Temperance Ins. Exch. v. Carver, 83 Idaho 487, 493, 365 P.2d 824, 827-28 (1961);
Evans Fin. Corp. v. Strasser, 99 N.M. 788, 790-91, 664 P.2d 986, 988-89 (1983); International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 n.2 (Utah
1981).
146. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 507, 509; Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478; Ross, 396
U.S. at 539-40.
147. See supra notes 67, 89 and accompanying text.
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outside of the common law or equity context. In Katchen v. Landy, 148
the Court found that though the bankruptcy court and common-law
courts had concurrent jurisdiction to order surrender of voidable prefer-
ences at the behest of a trustee in bankruptcy, the existence of the right to
jury in the common-law court did not mandate a jury when the same
claim was brought in the bankruptcy court. According to the Court,
practical considerations such as expediency, convenience, and efficiency
should be taken into account in determining whether a "legal" claim can
be brought in a special forum without the right to jury.149 In rejecting
the petitioner's argument that Dairy Queen required that he be provided
a jury for voidable preference issues, the Supreme Court noted:
[P]etitioner's argument would require that in every case where a Sec-
tion 57g objection is interposed and a jury trial is demanded the pro-
ceedings on allowance of claims must be suspended and a plenary suit
initiated, with all the delay and expense that course would entail. Such
a result is not consistent with the equitable purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act nor with the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, which is
itself an equitable doctrine. In neither Beacon Theatres nor Dairy
Queen was there involved a specific statutory scheme contemplating
the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the intervention of a
jury.
150
Like the bankruptcy proceedings, summary small claims proceedings
were created by statute to provide an inexpensive, speedy remedy with-
out the intervention of a jury. Thus, the Katchen Court's reasoning sug-
gests that Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres do not require provision of a
jury in small claims courts.
148. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
149. Id. at 328-29, 339; see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). Indeed, Dairy Queen, Beacon Theatres, and Ross ad-
dressed the continuing validity of doctrines permitting federal courts to resolve, without jury,
legal issues that are incidental to or common to equitable claims before the court. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M.K. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 13, at 485-86. These doctrines had
arisen primarily for the sake of efficiency and fairness, to avoid the necessity of two actions in
separate courts. But as the Court noted in Ross, the joining of law and equity under the
modem federal rules of civil procedure allows the same court to try legal issues before a jury
and resolve equitable issues itself within one action. 396 U.S. at 539-40. Cf Dairy Queen, 369
U.S. at 471 (describing the inconvenience of filing separate actions for legal and equitable
claims, which ultimately led to the consolidation of law and equity enabling legal and equitable
claims to be joined in a single action). Convenience and fairness no longer dictated such an
"all or nothing" rule allowing the court to resolve all issues---equitable and legal-without a
jury.
Juryless small claims procedures likewise were created to try "legal" issues without a jury
for the sake of efficiency and fairness. Nothing has occurred, however, to alleviate the hard-
ship that would be caused by mandating a right to jury for small monetary claims-the ex-
pense of a jury will still render litigation of such claims impractical.
150. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339 (citation omitted).
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Likewise, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 151 the Supreme Court found that when Congress
passed statutes creating "public rights," it was free to assign the adjudi-
cation of enforcement proceedings to an administrative tribunal to be de-
termined without a jury, even though the seventh amendment would
require a jury if adjudication of the rights were assigned to a common-
law court. 152 According to the Court, "history and our cases support the
proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of
the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be
resolved."
153
Thus, in Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross the particular rela-
tionship between the common-law and general equity courts required the
provision of a jury trial for all issues raised in equity that could now be
tried at law. Cases such as Katchen and Atlas Roofing negate the conten-
tion that all issues capable of trial to a jury at common law are entitled to
jury resolution, regardless of the forum. As long as a claim is properly
brought in a juryless small claims tribunal that is comparable in that
respect to one existing in England or the American colony or territory
when the state constitutional jury trial guarantee was adopted, a right to
jury should not attach, even if the jurisdiction of the precedent tribunal
was not exclusive.1 5
4
151. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
152. Id. at 455. The Court stated:
[I]t is apparent from the history of jury trial in civil matters that factfinding, which is
the essential function of the jury in civil cases, was never the exclusive province of the
jury under either the English or American legal systems at the time of the adoption
of the Seventh Amendment; and the question whether a fact would be found by a
jury turned to a considerable degree on the nature of the forum in which the litigant
found himself. Critical factfinding was performed without juries in suits in equity,
and there were no juries in admiralty; nor were there juries in the military justice
system....
The Seventh Amendment was declaratory of the existing law, for it required
only that jury trial in suits at common law was to be 'preserved.' It thus did not
purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. Moreover, it did not
seek to change the factfinding mode in equity or admiralty.
Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 460-61.
154. As the famous footnote 10 of the Ross opinion notes, in addition to historic custom
and the remedy sought, "the practical abilities and limitations of juries" should be considered
in determining whether a right to jury should attach. 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10. Certainly in the
small claims context this consideration would dictate finding no right to jury, as a jury cannot
function efficiently as a fact-finding mechanism in this context. See supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text; see also Wolfram, supra note 19, at 644 (analysis of Supreme Court's functional
approach to determine the right to jury trial).
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) does not suggest a different conclusion. In
Southall, it was argued that the general jurisdiction courts in the District of Columbia could
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V. Necessary Characteristics of the Modern Juryless Small
Claims Tribunal
State court systems have changed significantly since the states
adopted their constitutions, and most preconstitution small claims tribu-
nals no longer exist. Where state constitutions authorize the creation of
juryless tribunals for the resolution of small monetary claims, questions
arise concerning the essential characteristics of such tribunals. Modem
juryless tribunals should not be required to mimic their historical precur-
sors in technical details.155 Nor should it even be necessary that legisla-
deny a jury in suits in recovery of possession of property in order to expedite judicial disposi-
tion of landlord-tenant disputes. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because there was
no precedent for such action in England in 1791. Such precedent does exist in the case of small
monetary claims.
155. Since juryless proceedings for small claims often have been associated with courts
officially designated "not of record," it might be suggested that juryless proceedings may now
only be offered in courts that are not of record. Aside from numerous references in cases
linking juryless summary proceedings to courts not of record, see, e.g., Ex parte Thistleton, 52
Cal. 220, 225 (1877) (court of record equated with provision of jury), several state constitu-
tional jury trial guarantees specifically limit the constitutional right to a common-law jury of
12 to those cases brought in courts of record, thus associating courts not of record with a lesser
jury right. See WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 21 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,
but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of
record .... "); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount-in-controversy, but the Legisla-
ture may provide for a jury of less than twelve in any court not a court of record."); S DAKOTA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1885, 282-83, 286-88 (1907) (indicating that state constitu-
tion framers believed that thd right to a common-law jury only existed in courts of record and
that the constitutional provision should not extend the right to courts not of record).
Examination of the practices in England and the American colonies, however, reveals that
while many of the juryless small claims proceedings were in courts not of record, this was not
always the case. The English courts of request apparently were not regarded as courts of
record, see H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 34; see generally notes 54-82 and accompanying
text, but the new county courts which replaced them were. H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 232
n.219; Chapter 95, supra note 61, § 3; see generally supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
In the American colonies, justice of the peace courts generally were not deemed courts of
record. See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17 (1898); Ellis v. White, 25 Ala.
540, 542 (1854). There were, however, some exceptions to this rule. See, eg., Hooker v. State,
7 Blackf. 272, 273 (Ind. 1844); Hinchman v. Cook, 20 N.J.L. 271, 272 (1844).
The distinction between court of record and not of record also is unsatisfactory because
the concept has never attained a universal meaning, but appears to vary from one jurisdiction
to the next and even within jurisdictions. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
178 Tenn. 321, 325, 157 S.W.2d 831, 832 (1942); Seattle v. Filson, 98 Wash. 2d 66, 69, 653
P.2d 608, 610 (1982) (a court may be "of record" for some purposes and "not of record" for
other purposes); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY xiii (1977) ("No uniformly appli-
cable definition of courts 'of record' could be devised."); Stone, The Constitutional Guaranty of
Jury Trial, 3 ALB. L. REV. 293, 296-97 (1871); Alger, What is A Court of Record, 34 AM. L.
REV. 70, 70-74 (1900); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 26, at 405 (1965).
However, if status as a court "not of record" were deemed necessary to justify juryless
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tures create separate, freestanding tribunals to provide the juryless small
claims procedure; a small claims division offering a summary, juryless
procedure might be created within a general jurisdiction court.
The preconstitution juryless small claims tribunals had two key
characteristics which constitutionally their modem counterparts should
be required to emulate. First, these tribunals offered summary proceed-
ings that were specifically fashioned by legislative bodies to provide a
practical, inexpensive, speedy remedy for persons with small monetary
claims. Many aspects of traditional common-law procedure were dis-
carded because they were too costly and time consuming in relation to
the amount-in-controversy. 56 Second, jurisdiction of small claims tribu-
nals was limited, both in terms of subject matter and amount-in-contro-
versy, to those claims whose resolution could not justify the time and
expense of traditional common-law procedure.
1 57
Today when legislatures set out to create juryless small claims pro-
cedures as authorized by their state constitutions, they must first deter-
mine that such procedures are necessary in order to make relief available
as a practical matter to persons with small monetary claims,1 58 and they
must fashion a procedure that is reasonably calculated to accomplish
that end. They also must limit the availability of the procedure to those
claims whose amount-in-controversy and ramifications cannot in objec-
tive terms justify the time and expense of traditional common-law
procedures. 159
VI. Adjusting the Jurisdictional Amount-in-Controversy of
Juryless Small Claims Tribunals
A final question that arises in applying the historical test for the
small claims procedures, it should be noted that most presently existing small claims courts are
in fact designated courts "not of record." See SMALL CLAIMS COURTS, supra note 3, at 158-
59; Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 9, at 56-57.
156. See generally supra notes 3-5, 59-69, 84-88, 105-10 and accompanying text.
157. See generally supra notes 74-80, 87-96, 99-126 and accompanying text.
Deviation from common-law procedure and limited jurisdiction have often been recited as
characteristic of courts "not of record" as well. See, e.g., Ex parte Thistleton, 52 Cal. 220, 224-
25 (1877); State v. Allen, 117 Ohio St. 470, 473-75, 159 N.E. 591, 592-93 (1927); Brighton v.
Charleston, 114 Vt. 316, 330-31, 44 A.2d 628, 636-37 (1945); Snyder v. Wise, 10 Pa. St. 157,
158-59 (1848); Commonwealth v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 432-33, 131 A. 253, 256 (1925); Seattle v.
Filson, 98 Wash. 2d at 70-71, 653 P.2d at 610-11; Van Norman v. Gordon, 172 Mass. 576, 579,
53 N.E. 267, 268 (1899); Kenney v. Greer, 13 Ill. 432, 445, 448 (1851).
158. Legislative judgment should be subject to court scrutiny to ensure that it is within the
spirit of the original exception to the right to jury. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying
text.
159. See generally infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
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right to jury is whether the specific dollar amount-in-controversy limita-
tions imposed on juryless proceedings when the states adopted their con-
stitutions' 6° may be exceeded in juryless small claims proceedings today,
at least in those states where no minimum amount-in-controversy is ex-
pressly stated in the constitution. 161
A number of early cases suggested that the amount-in-controversy
limits for juryless proceedings in effect when the state's constitution was
enacted could not thereafter be raised. 162 The question arose indirectly
in cases where state legislatures had increased the limits of justice of the
peace jurisdiction and simultaneously provided for a trial de novo appeal,
with jury, for actions exceeding the previous jurisdictional limits. The
reviewing courts held that the constitutional right to jury had not been
violated by raising the jurisdiction of justices of peace because the right
could be satisfied either through provision for a jury in the original pro-
ceeding or on appeal, and here provision for jury had been made on ap-
peal.163 In finding as they did, the courts implied that there was a
constitutional right to jury in cases involving the increased jurisdictional
amount.164 However, such a finding was not necessary to resolve the
case and the courts did not purport to examine the merits of the issue in
any depth.
Three appellate courts that have directly considered the constitu-
tionality of raising the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy for juryless
160. A related question is whether today's juryless proceedings are limited to the precise
types of claims triable in such proceedings when the constitutional guarantee was adopted. As
indicated in sections II and III, the breadth of the subject matter jurisdiction of juryless small
claims courts varied from court to court in England and from state to state in the United
States, and changed over the course of time within each jurisdiction. This Article will not
undertake a separate examination of the types of actions that can be brought in a juryless
tribunal, though the underlying principles discussed in this section should be relevant to that
determination. See generally Evergreen Corp. v. Brown, 35 Conn. Supp. 549, 554-55, 396
A.2d 146, 149 (1978) (court reasons that legislature is free to subject eviction action to juryless
proceedings when only a month-to-month tenancy is involved, implying that this minor inter-
est in land is analogous to a small monetary claim and thus falls within the spirit of the excep-
tion to the right to jury for small monetary claims). But see Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416,
429 (Pa. 1808) (separate opinion of Brackenridge, J., who finds expansion of jurisdiction of
justices of peace through addition of new types of claims more objectionable than expansion
through raising amount-in-controversy).
161. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
162. See, eg., White v. Kendrick, 1 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 469,472 (1805); People ex reL Metro-
politan Board of Health v. Lane, 6 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 105 (1869).
163. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1898) and cases discussed therein; J.
PROFFATr, supra note 25, § 101, at 146.
164. It is possible that the state legislatures themselves also assumed that there was a right
to jury, and provided for a jury on appeal for that reason. Other factors may have been at
work as well, however, such as the public's desire to keep a check on untrained, sometimes
corrupt justices of the peace. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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small claims courts procedures have upheld the practice. 165 These deci-
sions make sense in light of the purpose juryless small claims court pro-
cedures were created to serve. These procedures are grounded in the
pragmatic realization that very small monetary disputes do not justify
the individual and societal expense of a jury. In many cases, the added
cost imposed through introduction of a jury would make litigation of a
small claim economically impractical, leaving a plaintiff with no realistic
means of obtaining legal redress. 166 As the value of money decreases and
the cost and complexity of jury trial litigation increases, the legislature
must be free to adjust the monetary threshold below which juryless pro-
ceedings are available in order to ensure that these proceedings continue
to serve the purpose of giving small claims plaintiffs access to the court.
Freezing the monetary ceilings for juryless proceedings as of the date a
constitution was enacted-at forty shillings, five pounds, or the
equivalent in dollars-would serve only slavish literalism and undermine
the original rationale for providing juryless procedures. Today an excep-
tion to the right to a jury for claims under forty shillings or five pounds
would be virtually meaningless. 167
In other respects the constitutional right to jury has not been con-
strued to require such literal adhesion to the practices in vogue when the
constitution was adopted as to preclude adjustments which promote "the
cause of justice and the general convenience," and do not thwart the pur-
poses underlying the right to jury trial. 168 Thus, courts have held that
legislatures can subject the right to jury to reasonable conditions and reg-
ulations, such as requiring the posting of a bond to cover the increased
costs of a jury trial.169 Likewise, courts have held that, contrary to com-
165. See Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 240-41 (1871); Iowa Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 305 N.W.2d 724, 726-29 (Iowa 1981); Crouchman v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App.
3d 102, 217 Cal. Rptr. 910, petition for review granted, 708 P.2d 703, 220 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1985). The court in Mitchell found that an exception to the right to jury existed for small
monetary claims in English law, and then held that the legislature was empowered to raise the
amount-in-controversy ceiling below which a jury need not be afforded. Though the court's
conclusion is consistent with the thesis advanced in this Article, the court's reasoning differs
from the line of reasoning emphasized by the author of this Article.
166. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
167. Even as late as 1830, forty shillings represented a substantial amount of money. Ac-
cording to one source, it represented more than the weekly wage of most manual and clerical
workers in England. See H. ARTHURS, supra note 41, at 26, 224 n.94. Today it amounts to
wages for approximately one hour of labor at minimum wage. See generally Fifth Report,
supra note 42, at 12-15 (discussing the effect of the decrease in the value of money over time on
the practical effectiveness of inferior courts, and describing the difference in buying power of
40 shillings in the fourteenth century and in the nineteenth century).
168. Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 54 (1867).
169. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof., 174 U.S. 1, 43-46 (1898); County of Portage v. Stein-
preis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 471-76, 312 N.W.2d 731, 733-35 (1981). In Steinpreis, a territorial
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mon-law practice, the jury verdict need not be unanimous, 170 and the
jury may be comprised of fewer than twelve members, 17 because neither
of these adjustments interferes with the basic purpose of the jury trial
guarantee. When constitutional jury trial guarantees were adopted, ex-
isting laws drew a line at a point where the cost of a jury could be justi-
fied in economic and societal terms. Readjusting that line to
accommodate changes in the value of money and the cost of juries would
perpetuate, rather than undermine, the original purpose of the amount-
in-controversy threshold.
It is likely that constitutional framers contemplated that the
amount-in-controversy limits for juryless proceedings would be adjusted
from time to time to accommodate changing social needs, as they had
been adjusted, in the past, both in England 72 and in the colonies and
territories.1 73 In Connecticut, for example, in 1717, the justice of the
peace tried actions for amounts under forty shillings without jury. There
was no appeal, and thus no access to a jury in a higher court, in cases
involving less than ten shillings.1 74 In 1724, appeal, and thus access to a
jury, was limited to cases involving twenty shillings or more.1 75 In 1736,
if debt was due by bond and did not exceed forty shillings, no appeal, and
thus no access to jury, was afforded. 176 In 1767, the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace to try cases without a jury was raised to five pounds
and, in 1769, the right of appeal for all cases so tried was removed.
177
When the Connecticut Constitution was adopted, justices of the peace
tried cases without jury or right to appeal in cases involving less than
seven dollars. 1
78
Some years after the Connecticut constitutional jury trial guarantee
statute had imposed a fee upon parties demanding juries for small claims. The court found
that a subsequent raise in the fee was not an unconstitutional denial of the right to jury, in light
of the relative purchasing power of money and the increased cost and time entailed in jury
trials.
170. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972).
171. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973).
172. As noted in section II, in the 1600s and 1700s, Parliament determined that forty
shillings was the proper ceiling for juryless proceedings in the courts of request. Beginning in
the early 1800s, Parliament began to raise the ceiling with subsequent court of request acts so
that the norm eventually became five pounds. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
This five pound ceiling was carried over to the new county courts. See supra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
173. See generally supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.




178. Id. at 54.
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was adopted the state legislature raised the threshold for appeals from
the still juryless justice of the peace court from seven to fifteen dollars.
In Guile v. Brown, 179 the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected arguments
that the post constitution increase was an unconstitutional denial of the
right to jury trial in those cases involving between seven and fifteen dol-
lars, reasoning that the constitutional guarantee was not intended to
freeze the final jurisdiction of a justice of the peace at the sum of seven
dollars:
The framers of the constitution did not descend to particulars, but con-
tented themselves with embodying and promulgating certain general
principles, leaving the details to be supplied by ordinary legislation....
The history of legislation on this subject will show that the legislature,
prior to the adoption of the constitution, varied the extent of the final
jurisdiction of justices of the peace and other inferior tribunals from
time to time as occasion required, so that, during the whole period
since the settlement of the state, there has been no fixed, definite sum
that has marked the limit of that jurisdiction .... It cannot be said
therefore that the constitution, even by implication, fixes the limit at
any definite sum. 18
0
Evidence that the constitution's framers intended the ceiling for
juryless proceedings to be adjusted as the need arose can also be found in
the history of legislative activity immediately following the adoptions of
the constitutions in some states. For example, the legislatures in Ohio
and Pennsylvania raised the justice of the peaces' final jurisdiction very
shortly after adopting their respective constitutions, 8' which indicates
that they understood that the framers intended that this could be done.
State legislatures should have the authority to determine, in light of
current economic conditions, what presently constitutes a "small claim"
for purposes of the right to jury. 182 The courts should serve only as a
check' 18 3 on any legislation that is inconsistent with the spirit and pur-
179. 38 Conn. 237, 241 (1871).
180. Id. at 241; see Curtis, 34 Conn. at 55.
181. See supra notes 113, 120 and accompanying text.
182. See Crouchman, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 913 ("the determination
of a reasonable small claims jurisdiction amount [is] an appropriate legislative function now as
it was in 1850"); Curtis, 34 Conn. at 55 ("So long as the legislature keeps substantially within
the limits prescribed to itself by long usage, taking into consideration the relative depreciation
in the value of money and the altered condition of the business interests of the state, we have
no disposition to interfere by way of judicial veto"); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 625 (A.
Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1904) ("[T]he changes which are continually happening in the
affairs of society may render a different mode of determining questions of property, preferable
in many cases, in which that mode of trial [jury trial] now prevails. . . . The examples of
innovations which contract its ancient limits, as well in these states as in Great Britain, afford a
strong presumption that its former extent has been found inconvenient; and give room to sup-
pose that future experience may discover the propriety and utility of other exceptions.")
183. See Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 241-43 (1871).
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Given the historical test for defining the right to jury, and in light of
the early English and American practice of withholding a jury in cases
involving small monetary claims, modem legislatures in many states
should have the flexibility to fashion a small claims procedure that dis-
penses altogether with access to a jury.185 Such legislative action would
remove an inherently inequitable strategic measure to frustrate resolution
of small claims on the merits that presently is available to wealthy par-
ties. Juryless small claims procedures will satisfy constitutional require-
ments as long as legislatures stay within the spirit of the original
exception to the right to jury trial, and only provide for juryless proce-
dures in those actions in which the amount-in-controversy does not jus-
tify the cost of a jury.
184. See J. PROFFATr, supra note 100, § 100, at 145. Empirical research would be useful
to determine the amount at which a claim will not be rendered impractical to litigate from an
economic standpoint if a jury trial is demanded.
185. This probably would not be the case, of course, in states in which a minimum
amount-in-controversy for the right to jury is expressly stated in -the constitution. See supra
note 131 and accompanying text.
November 1987]
HeinOnline -- 39 Hastings L. J. 163 1987-1988
HeinOnline -- 39 Hastings L. J. 164 1987-1988
